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THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND CONTENT
RESTRICTIONS IN STATE FILM INCENTIVE
PROGRAMS
Dr. Joel Timmer
In recent years, many states have offered incentive programs to
lure film production and its associated economic benefits—increased
jobs, spending, and tourism—to their states. Several of these programs
have restrictions that deny incentives based on a film’s content. For
example, Texas denies film incentives to projects that have
“inappropriate content” or portray “Texas or Texans in a negative way.”
This article concludes that these restrictions do not violate the First
Amendment. Two key considerations factor into this conclusion: First,
in granting subsidies, the government may apply criteria that would be
impermissible in a regulatory context. Second, the denial of a subsidy
is not the same as the infringement of a right.
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INTRODUCTION

Film production yields many economic benefits, including
increased jobs and tourism. It should come as no surprise, therefore,
that many states have created incentive programs to lure film production
to their state. These programs, however, often come with restrictions,
such as what type of content may make a film ineligible. For example,
Texas may deny support from its incentive programs to projects that
have “inappropriate content” or portray “Texas or Texans in a negative
way.”1
This article addresses the question of whether the denial of film
incentives based on a film’s content violates a filmmaker’s First
Amendment free-speech right; it concludes it does not. Part II
introduces the Machete controversy and the Texas film incentive
program. Part III provides an overview of film incentive programs’
inception and the benefits they provide states. Part IV examines the
Texas film incentive program’s operation and standards—arguably
some of the most restrictive state film incentive program standards in
the nation. 2 Part V provides a brief overview of First Amendment
protections for film. Part VI examines the public forum doctrine and its
applicability to state film incentive program restrictions, while Part VII
examines the unconstitutional conditions doctrine and its applicability
here. Part VIII builds on Parts VI and VII, analyzing the First
Amendment principles applicable to government subsidies like film
incentives. Part IX examines two cases in which denials of government
funding for art—based on government objections to the art—were
found to violate the First Amendment. Part X then returns to the
Machete controversy, delving more deeply into the court’s decision in
Machete’s Chop Shop, Inc. and a similar case involving the Machete
sequel, Machete Kills. Finally, Part XI concludes that state film
incentive provisions that allow film content to be a consideration for
subsidy grants, are unlikely to violate the First Amendment.

1. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 485.022(e) (West 2017).
2. See Brice Wallace, The Screening Process: A Form of Censorship or a Way to
Safeguard Taxpayer Money?, DESERET NEWS (Nov. 16, 2008, 12:00 AM), http://www.deseret
news.com/article/705263109/The-screening-process-A-form-of-censorship-or-a-way-to-safeguard
-taxpayer-money.html? [http://perma.cc/6V7F-SG27].
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II. The Machete Controversy And
The Texas State Film Incentive Program
Beginning as nothing more than a fake trailer, the film Machete,
and its sequel, Machete Kills, stirred up controversy over the use of
Texas’ film incentive funds to support projects that portray the state in a
negative light.3
This controversy resulted in two court cases
challenging a state’s ability to deny financial incentives for a film based
on its content. The basis for the controversy is best illustrated by the
following quote from a character—Texas State Senator McLaughlin—
in the 2010 Machete film, speaking at a rally about immigrants:
The aliens, the infiltrators, the outsiders, they come right across by
light of day or dark of night. They’ll bleed us, they’re parasites.
They’ll bleed us until we as a city, a county, a state, a nation are all
bled out. Make no mistake: we are at war. Every time an illegal
dances across our border it is an act of aggression against this
sovereign state, an overt act of terrorism.4

The fake Machete trailer originally appeared in the 2007 double
feature Grindhouse,5 consisting of the films “Planet Terror, written and
directed by [Robert] Rodriguez, and Death Proof, written and directed
by [Quentin] Tarantino.”6
Fake film-trailers and commercials
accompany the double feature, all meant to simulate and “heighten the
experience of exploitation double features of decades past.”7 The
3. Reeve Hamilton, Robert Rodriguez Film at Issue in Incentive Debate, TEXAS TRIBUNE
(Sept. 3, 2010, 5:00 AM), https://www.texastribune.org/2010/09/03/robert-rodriguez-film-atissue-in-incentive-debate/ [http://perma.cc/3E5U-MDD2].
4. Machete (2010)—Plot Summary, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0985694/synopsis
[http://perma.cc/J5WF-ERA7].
5. Nikki Finke, Fox Wins Studio War for Robert Rodriguez’ ‘Machete’; Now His New
Filmmaking Home, DEADLINE (Jan. 24, 2010, 1:58 PM), http://deadline.com/2010/01/fox-winsstudio-war-for-robert-rodriguez-machete-and-will-be-his-new-filmmaking-home-23299/
[http://perma.cc/VZ4H-BL7Q].
6. Henriette Maria Aschenbrenner, Two of a Kind—Robert Rodriguez’s and Quentin
Tarantino’s Culturally Intertextual Comment on Film History: The Grindhouse Project, 33 POST
SCRIPT 42, 43 (2014).
7. Id.
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Machete trailer, directed by Rodriguez, kicks off the double feature.
The trailer’s protagonist, Machete, is a “Mexican day laborer [who] is
set up, double-crossed, and left for dead—then starts everyone’s worst
nightmare.”8 Considered by some to be “the single best thing about”
Grindhouse, the trailer went on to rack up 1.4 million YouTube views
within a couple of years.9 The trailer also ended up spawning two
actual films,10 as well as controversy over the Texas film incentive
program’s support for the film. 11
Rodriguez based the trailer and films’ concept on the story of a
Mexican national police officer (a Federale) “who gets hired to do
hatchet jobs in the U.S.”12 Seeking to create a “‘70s-style B-movie’”13
with a Mexican action hero in Charles Bronson or Jean-Claude Van
Damme’s vein, 14 Rodriguez packed the Machete trailer and films with
“a relentless onslaught of over-the-top violence, extreme gore,
gratuitous nudity and cheap laughs.” 15 It is an “example of the genre
cheekily labeled ‘Mexploitation’”16 and “a relentless series of action set
pieces in which Machete dispatches his opponents using any and all

8. Finke, supra note 5; see also Machete (2010)—Plot Summary, supra note 4.
9. Finke, supra note 5.
10. Aschenbrenner, supra note 6 at 43 (explaining that “[t]he films were both shot back to
back and were to be shown in one session with the intention to recreate a complete cultural setting
in reminiscence of 1960s–1980s movie theaters in which the audience could watch double
features of various B-movies”).
11. Hamilton, supra note 3.
12. Gavin Edwards, Online Exclusive: Horror Film Directors Dish about Grindhouse
Trailers, ROLLING S TONE (April 19, 2007, 11:49 AM), http://archive.li/4kZTI [https://perma.
cc/89HH-PVVQ].
13. Frank Sheck, Machete: Film Review, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Oct. 14, 2007, 10:04
PM), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/review/machete-film-review-29917 [http://perma.cc/
Y73Z-BPD9].
14. Peter Sciretta, Grindhouse: Rodriguez to Turn They Call Him Machete into Feature
Length Movie, /F ILM (March 12, 2007), http://www.slashfilm.com/grindhouse-rodriguez-to-turnthey-call-him-machete-into-feature-length-movie/ [http://perma.cc/NP5C-BCMP].
15. Sheck, supra note 13.
16. Id.

TIMMER

3/22/2018 8:01 PM

2018]

THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND CONTENT RESTRICTIONS

43

sharp objects available, from surgical instruments to the fearsome titular
blade.”17
With plans to shoot the first Machete film in Texas, the film’s
production company, Machete Chop Shop (“Chop Shop”), applied for a
grant to help finance the film’s production under Texas’ Film Incentive
Program. 18
The Texas Film Commission granted Chop Shop
preliminary approval for a grant for Machete. 19
Prior to the release of Grindhouse, and in response to recent
developments, Rodriguez recut the Machete trailer to take aim at
Arizona and its newly-enacted anti-immigration law. 20 The trailer
featured an introduction by the title character saying, “‘This is Machete
with a special Cinco de Mayo message . . . to Arizona.’ Mayhem,
including shots of angry illegal immigrants rising up in rebellion,
followed.”21 In response to the recut trailer, conservative radio talk
show host and accused “conspiracy theorist,” Alex Jones began a
campaign against the film. 22 Jones asserted that Machete was likely “to
trigger racial riots and racial killings in the United States,”23 and he

17. Id.
18. Machete Prods., L.L.C. v. Page, 809 F.3d 281 (5th Cir. 2015).
19. Id. Specifically, the commission notified Chop Shop that an initial review concluded
that the film fulfilled the Incentive Program’s content requirement, but that this assessment
“‘pertain[ed] only to the qualification of the application’ and that ‘[i]f the final content is
determined to be in violation of the rules and regulations of the incentive program, the project
[would] not be eligible to receive funds’ from the Program.” Machete’s Chop Shop, Inc. v. Tex.
Film Comm’n, 483 S.W.3d 272, 276 (Tex. Ct. App. 2016) (alteration in original).
20. That law was SB 1070, which made “it a crime for immigrants not to carry their
documents.” Jay A. Fernandez & Borys Kit, How “Machete” Inflames Immigration Debate,
HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Aug. 26, 2010, 10:40 PM), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/
how-machete-inflames-immigration-debate-27149 [http://perma.cc/E3GU-48MM]; Soraya Roberts,
Robert Rodriguez Cuts ‘Illegal’ Trailer for ‘Machete’ to Protest Arizona Immigration Law,
DAILY NEWS (May 6, 2010, 10:39 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/entertainment/tvmovies/robert-rodriguez-cuts-illegal-trailer-machete-protest-arizona-immigration-law-article-1.19
0695 [https://perma.cc/C3S6-4FXY].
21. Fernandez & Kit, supra note 20.
22. Richard Whittaker, Is that a Wrap for Incentives?, AUSTIN C HRONICLE (Jan. 28,
2011), https://www.austinchronicle.com/screens/2011-01-28/is-that-a-wrap-for-incentives
[https://perma.cc/3D4B-5RQP].
23. Hamilton, supra note 3.
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denounced the film as the “equivalent of a Hispanic Birth of a Nation”
for inciting “racial jihad.”24 When it came to light that the commission
had given preliminary approval to the film’s grant application, and that
it had assisted filmmakers with location access, 25 Jones also began a
campaign to eliminate state funding for the film. 26 This resulted in “a
wave of letters to the Governor’s Office and the Texas Film
Commission, savaging [Machete] as a call to a race war.”27
In the film, Danny Trejo plays “Machete,” the Federale named “for
his deadly skill” with the device. 28 Towards the beginning of the film,
Machete defies his superior’s direct order and attempts to free a
kidnapping victim from a drug lord, only to learn that the drug lord is
working with his superior.29 Disappointed that Machete will not take
bribe money to look the other way, his superior has Machete’s wife
killed in front of him and informs Machete that his daughter has
suffered a similar fate.30 Machete is left to die,31 but he survives, ending
up as a day laborer and vigilante in Texas.32 There, a businessman hires
24. Id.
25. Racist Film ‘Machete’ Produced with Taxpayer Funds, INFOWARS (May 14, 2010),
https://www.infowars.com/racist-film-machete-produced-with-taxpayer-funds [https://perma.cc/43 52-FLWX].
26. Whittaker, supra note 22.
27. Id. (explaining that “[o]ver the course of six months, the film commission received
around 500 letters”); see Alexander Zaitchik, Does Robert Rodriguez’s ‘Machete’ Evoke ‘Race
War’?, S. POVERTY L AW C TR. (Sept. 10, 2010), https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2010/09/
10/does-robert-rodriguez%E2%80%99s-%E2%80%98machete%E2%80%99-advocate-%E2%80%
98race-war%E2%80%99 [http://perma.cc/6GD4-FWVH].
28. Action Comedy ‘Machete’ Explores Illegal Immigration Controversy, VOA (Sept. 6,
2010, 8:00 PM), https://www.voanews.com/a/action-comedy-machete-explores-illegalimmigration-controversy-102338284/164770.html [https://perma.cc/9F65-J6SS]; Nicole Kinsley,
Texas Film Commission Permitted to Slice and Dice Financial Incentives to Machete Films,
TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT L AW, (Feb. 29, 2016) http://www.trademarkandcopyright
lawblog.com/2016/02/texas-film-commission-permitted-to-slice-and-dice-financial-incentives-tomachete-films/ [http://perma.cc/6Q3M-485B].
29. Machete (2010)—Plot Summary, supra note 4.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See id.
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him to assassinate a Texas senator using inflammatory rhetoric while
campaigning against illegal immigrants. 33 Before carrying out the plot,
Machete learns he has been double-crossed and is shot and wounded by
one of the businessman’s aides. 34 The assassination turns out to be a
ploy by the businessman and senator who are working together; 35 their
goal is to use Machete’s failed assassination attempt to stir “antiimmigrant sympathies among Texas voters.” 36 Here is where the film’s
tagline—”They just fucked with the wrong Mexican” 37—comes into
play. Seeking revenge, Machete “initiates an out-and-out killing spree,
recruiting an angry mob along the way, whose leader decries ‘We didn’t
cross the border, the border crossed us’ in downtown Austin.” 38 With
the assistance of “an army of illegal immigrants” he has gathered,
Machete seeks revenge against the men who double-crossed him. 39
Ultimately, Machete becomes a hero for oppressed immigrants. 40
Alex Jones, in criticizing the film’s potential to incite “violence”
and “riots,” describes its ending this way:
By the end, the vicious revenge killer [Machete] is cast in the holy
light of a martyr; his likeness is placed on religious candles as the
Virgin Mary or Jesus Christ would be. Vulnerable illegal
immigrants, seeking to evade crude Militia Men characters as they
cross the border, pray to Machete for protection, in the hopes [that]
he will wipe out their enemies. Machete becomes a folk hero of

33. Alex Jones and Aaron Dykes, New Film ‘Machete’ Evokes Race War, INFOWARS
(May 9, 2010), https://www.infowars.com/new-film-machete-to-provoke-race-war/ [http://perma.
cc/9TA9-ZYDZ]; Sheck, supra note 13.
34. Bruce Watson, ‘Machete’ Trailer Takes a Smart Slash at Arizona’s Immigration Law,
AOL (May 8, 2010, 10:00 AM), https://www.aol.com/2010/05/08/machete-movie-trailer-smartslash-arizona-immigration-law/ [http://perma.cc/6BU2-ME96].
35. Hamilton, supra note 3.
36. Id.
37. See Finke, supra note 5.
38. Jones & Dykes, New Film ‘Machete’ Evokes Race War, supra note 33.
39. Watson, supra note 34.
40. See Machete (2010)—Plot Summary, supra note 4.
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sorts, like a Father Hidalgo figure,41 and his iconography carries
over into the traditional use of the machete as a symbol of peasant
uprisings.42

Following the political controversy, the commission departed from
its favorable preliminary determination and instead “denied Chop
Shop’s application for a grant due to ‘inappropriate content or content
that portrays Texas or Texans in a negative fashion.’” 43 Yet, there had
been no significant changes to the script from the time of the
commission’s preliminary approval to the film’s completion. 44 Chop
Shop therefore filed suit, alleging a violation of its Fourteenth
Amendment due process rights and contesting the commission’s
authority. 45 The case, Machete’s Chop Shop, Inc. v. Texas Film
Commission, raised the question of whether a state may deny a
filmmaker incentives because the state objects to the content of a
filmmaker’s production. 46 After all, the Supreme Court has stated that,
“the government offends the First Amendment when it imposes
financial burdens on certain speakers based on the content of their
expression.”47

41. Father Hidalgo was a leader of the Mexican War of Independence. See Miguel
Hidalgo y Costilla, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Miguel_Hidalgo_y_Costilla
[http://perma.cc/3MKL-5DPN].
42. Alex Jones & Aaron Dykes, Leaked ‘Machete’ Script Confirms Race War Plot,
INFOWARS (May 13, 2010), https://www.infowars.com/leaked-machete-script-confirms-race-warplot/ [http://perma.cc/YFD9-TR5Z] (emphasis omitted).
43. Machete Prods., L.L.C. v. Page, 809 F.3d 281, 286 (5th Cir. 2015).
44. Kinsley, supra note 28.
45. Machete’s Chop Shop, Inc., 483 S.W.3d at 277.
46. See id.
47. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995) (citing
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1991)).
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III. STATE FILM INCENTIVE PROGRAMS
A. The Inception of Film Incentive Programs
In 1992, Louisiana became “the first state to adopt state tax
incentives for film and television production.” 48 Once Louisiana’s
program proved successful in encouraging strong film and television
production growth within the state, other states responded by offering
their own incentives.49 As a result, “[b]y 2009, 44 U.S. states, Puerto
Rico, and Washington D.C. offered some form of film and television
production incentives.”50 The basic theory behind these incentive
programs is that states themselves benefit economically from bringing
production to their locales.51 Specifically, “film production[s] . . . create
new jobs and boost sales at area businesses, as companies rush to fill
positions, purchase equipment and acquire other resources to keep
filming on schedule. Benefits . . . then spread, as spillover effects of the
initial ‘shock’ multiply through the local economy.” 52
B. State Subsidies
According to the Council of State Governments, the most common
types of state film and television production subsidies are:
•

“Tax credits [which] reduce income tax liability. To
qualify, companies must generally commit to some
minimum amount of in-state production expenditures. The
credit is usually offered as a percentage of these dollars.”53

48. State Film Production Incentives and Programs, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES (June 13, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/fiscal-policy/state-film-productionincentives-and-programs.aspx [https://perma.cc/AW8W-UVCV].
49. Id.; see, e.g., Bryn Elise Sandberg, Film and TV Tax Incentives: A State-by-State
Guide, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Apr. 21, 2016, 10:00 AM), http://www.hollywoodreporter.
com/news/film-tv-tax-incentives-a-885699 [https://perma.cc/AW8W-UVCV].
50. State Film Production Incentives and Programs, supra note 48.
51. Zach Huitink, An Update on State Film Industry Incentives, THE COUNCIL OF STATE
GOV’TS (June 15, 2011, 12:02 PM), http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/content/update-state-filmindustry-incentives [https://perma.cc/K5R8-H9V6].
52. Id.
53. Id.
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•
•

“Cash rebates . . . for qualified production expenses.” 54
Cash grants, “generally awarded to offset either a) a
percentage of the dollar value of qualified production
expenditures, or b) all the associated sales and use tax.”55
• Other assistance, including “lodging exemptions, free
access to filming locations, and low-cost use of
government services (such as police officers to direct
traffic around an outdoor set).” 56
Because these incentive programs can help film-producers save
significantly on production costs, they are highly appealing. 57
C. Benefits to the State
States can benefit in at least four ways from attracting production
to their locales.58 The first benefit is the attraction of “out-of-state
investment” to the state. Film production requires filmmakers to
purchase “many goods and services, such as hardware, lumber, catering,
and security, which are provided by state vendors and suppliers.” 59
Additionally, production personnel may also boost economic activity in
a locale by spending money on lodging, dining, and entertainment. In
turn, the state collects taxes on all of these expenditures. 60 The second
benefit is the creation of jobs for state residents. “The majority of film
production work is performed by a wide array of employees such as
technicians, truck drivers, caterers, construction crews, architects, and
attorneys. 70 to 80 percent of those film production workers are hired
locally.”61 The third benefit is the stimulation of “film-related state

54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Scott Ahmad, Can the First Amendment Stop Content Restriction in State Film
Incentive Programs?, 16 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 395, 403 (2009).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.(citations omitted).
61. Id.(citations omitted).
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tourism,”—tourists traveling to visit locations featured in a film. 62 The
fourth benefit is that filmmakers may “invest significant resources to
develop communities in order to create the right look for a film. In that
process, they make many improvements, including building repair, road
pavement, and garden planting. The improvements remain long after
the filming ends.”63
A study on the impact of the Texas Incentive Program found the
following benefits for the State of Texas:
Based on the $58.1 million paid and encumbered as of December
31, 2010, total economic benefits from the moving image industry
incentive program were approximately $1.1 billion in direct,
indirect, and induced economic activity in Texas from 2007
through 2010. This can be interpreted another way: for every
dollar of the $58.1 million the Texas Film Commission had paid or
encumbered as of December 31, 2010, $18.72 in private sector
economic activity had been generated within the State of Texas.64

Numbers provided by the State of Texas seem to confirm the
incentive program’s benefits:
[T]he [Texas] comptroller’s office reported that in 2005, before the
incentives took effect, there were 51 film and TV projects in Texas,
spending a total of $155 million. By 2009 [after the incentives took
effect in 2007],65 there were 244 projects worth $249.7 million.66
62. Id. at 403–04 (citations omitted) (observing that, for example, “65,000 tourists a year
visit the cornfield in Iowa where the 1989 movie Field of Dreams was set”).
63. Id. at 404 (citations omitted) (observing that, for example, “[a]ccording to the
National Governors Association, the film industry has been the key to economic recovery in
Louisiana after the devastation caused by Hurricane Katrina in 2005”).
64. James E. Jarrett & Bruce Kellison, Texas Moving Image Industry Incentive Program:
The Economic Benefits from Incentives, (April 2011), https://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/bitstream/
handle/2152/14734/bbr-2011-texas-film-incentives.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y [https://perma.cc/
C9BT-326V].
65. History | Texas Film Commission, TEX. FILM COMM’N, https://gov.texas.gov/film/
page/history [https://perma.cc/PJF4-F72P].
66. Richard Whittaker, Is that a Wrap for Incentives?, AUSTIN CHRONICLE (Jan. 28, 2011),
https://www.austinchronicle.com/screens/2011-01-28/is-that-a-wrap-for-incentives [https://perma.cc/
3D4B-5RQP].
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In total, projects approved for incentives created 27,057 jobs,
including 3,790 full-time positions.67

The comptroller’s report went on to estimate “that eligible projects
have brought $600 million in economic activity to Texas.”68
While several studies have found incentive programs beneficial,
others have reached a contrary conclusion. Some studies have found
that incentive programs do not provide meaningful economic benefits to
states that offer them. 69 For example, critics argue that subsidies and
credits cost states and “reward producers for projects they might have
undertaken anyway.”70 Many production-related jobs “are temporary
and part-time,” and non-residents often fill a large portion of them—
especially the highest-paid jobs. 71 Critics also suggest that “[f]ilm
subsidies don’t pay for themselves, so state taxpayers bear the
burden.”72 Competition among states to attract productions may also
force states to “give movie-makers generous subsidies indefinitely in
order to ‘stay in the game.’”73
The popularity of state incentive programs is in decline. By
“2016, only 37 states . . . maintain[ed] film incentive programs
[compared to 44 in 2009], and several of [those] states . . . tighten[ed]
the requirements for qualifying expenses and reel[ed]-in per-project and
annual program caps.”74 Studies suggest these incentive programs’
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See, e.g., Michael Thom, Lights, Camera, but No Action? Tax and Economic
Development Lessons from State Motion Picture Incentive Programs, THE AM. REVIEW OF PUB.
ADMIN. (June 5, 2016), http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0275074016651958
[https://perma.cc/BWK7-96ZH]; Robert Tannenwald, State Film Subsidies: Not Much Bang for
too Many Bucks, CTR. ON BUDGET & P OLICY PRIORITIES, http://www.cbpp.org/research/statefilm-subsidies-not-much-bang-for-too-many-bucks?fa=view&id=3326 [http://perma.cc/S2VY-4V
ZD].
70. Tannenwald, supra note 69.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. State Film Production Incentives and Programs, supra note 48.
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decline is due to their costliness, inability to induce overall economic
growth, and “failure to raise tax revenue.” 75
In addition to fiscal concerns, Texas policymakers have also
expressed content concerns about some of the films receiving state
support.76 Machete, discussed infra in more depth, is not the only film
to have drawn such concern. Glory Road, a Texas-filmed 2006 sports
drama tells “the inspirational tale of the [1966] Texas Western Miners,
the first all-black college basketball team to win a national
championship.”77 The film raised concern among Texas legislators and
led to content-based considerations being added to the Texas Incentive
Program. 78
Although Glory Road is based on actual events, the filmmakers
took poetic license in portraying the story. 79 A scene depicting “a
racially charged incident” during a college basketball game caused the
most concern. 80 Portrayed “as a factual event,” the scene shows a white
Texas A&M (Aggies) team “thr[owing] epitaphs disparaging” the
opponent team’s black players.81 The scene also depicts the “Aggie
fans as racist.”82 Texas A&M, having not been involved in the actual

75. William Luther, Movie Production Incentives: Blockbuster Support for Lackluster
Policy, TAX FOUND. (Jan. 2010), https://files.taxfoundation.org/legacy/docs/sr173.pdf
[https://perma.cc/936X-VP4B].
76. Charles Ealy & Chris Garcia, ‘Waco’ Gets the Red Light from Texas Film
Commission, AUSTIN AM.-S TATESMAN (May 25, 2009), http://www.culteducation.com/group/
1220-waco-davidians/24339-waco-gets-the-red-light-from-texas-film-commission.html [http://perma.
cc/49GR-W7SL].
77. Hilary Hylton, Filming Texas in a Good Light, TIME (July 2, 2007),
http://content.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,1639352,00.html [https://perma.cc/XW9M-7HWU];
Ealy & Garcia, supra note 76.
78. Id.
79. Katy Vine, This Film Is Not Yet Rated, TEX. MONTHLY (July 2009),
http://www.texasmonthly.com/articles/this-film-is-not-yet-rated/ [http://perma.cc/9LY5-RWLF].
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Ealy & Garcia, supra note 76; Hylton, supra note 77.
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incident, took offense and objected to being “disparaged” in this
manner.83
It was around the time of the Glory Road controversy that the
Texas Legislature began considering the creation of a state film
incentive program. 84 Initially, the proposal for the program “had no
content provision, except for [a prohibition on state funding of]
pornography.”85 Following the Glory Road controversy, State Senate
Finance Committee Chairman Steve Ogden (R-Bryan)—”whose district
includes Texas A&M University”—added a provision to the bill
preventing incentives from being granted to films depicting Texas or
Texans in a negative light. 86
The Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) opposed the
provision on First Amendment grounds and urged Texas Governor Rick
Perry to veto the bill, stating:
This provision is a direct indictment of the creative process and
American values of free expression that are fundamental to our
democracy. . . . Motion pictures made in the United States are the
most popular form of entertainment worldwide because filmmakers
are free to tell stories on film without fear of government
censorship. Such restrictions . . . burden protected speech and
constitute prior restraint and government intervention, which the
U.S. Supreme Court has ruled many times is impermissible.87

Nevertheless, the provision became law. 88
Texas is not the only state to consider the content of film and
television projects seeking state funding. 89 In Wisconsin, productions

83. Vine, supra note 79.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Hylton, supra note 77; see also Ealy & Garcia, supra note 76.
87. Brice Wallace, The Screening Process: A Form of Censorship or a Way to Safeguard
Taxpayer Money?, DESERET NEWS (Nov. 16, 2008, 12:00 AM), http://www.deseretnews.com/
article/705263109/The-screening-process-A-form-of-censorship-or-a-way-to-safeguard-taxpayermoney.html [http://perma.cc/6V7F-SG27] (quotation omitted).
88. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 485.022(e) (West 2017).
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do not qualify for incentives if they “will hurt the reputation of the
state.”90 Similarly, a production that “portrays West Virginia in a
‘significantly derogatory manner’ is ineligible for West Virginia film
credits.”91 Pennsylvania and Kentucky only provide support for
productions that positively affect state tourism. 92 Other states impose
similar restrictions.93
IV. THE TEXAS FILM INCENTIVE PROGRAM:
OPERATION AND STANDARDS
The Texas Film Commission (“Commission”)—a division of the
Texas Music, Film, Television and Multimedia Office—administers the
Texas film incentive program, formally called the Moving Image
Industry Incentive Program (“Incentive Program”). 94 The Incentive
Program provides filmmakers various types of assistance, including
state-funded financial grants.95 For a grant to be approved, the
Commission “must consider at a minimum: (1) the current and likely
future effect a moving image project will have on employment, tourism,

89. See Hollis L. Hyans & Open Weaver Banks, Should Filmmakers Be Content to Have
Taxing Authorities Judge Their Content?, MORRISON & F OERSTER N EWS 1, 2 (Winter
2012), http://media.mofo.com/files/uploads/Images/120117-State-Local-Tax-Insights-Winter2012.pdf [perma.cc/2GSR-J9CX].
90. Id.
91. Id. (citing W. VA. CODE § 11-13X-3(b)(8)(F) (2016)).
92. Id. (citing KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148.546(9) (West 2015); see Film Tax Credit
Program Guidelines, PA. DEP’T OF CMTY. & ECON. DEV. (Oct. 2009), http://filminpa.com/wpcontent/uploads/2009/07/Film-Tax-Credit_Guidelines-09.pdf [https://perma.cc/57YX-BF8M]
(providing that “[t]he Pennsylvania Film Office may consider,” among other criteria, “whether
the project will tend to foster a positive image of Pennsylvania”).
93. See Ahmad, supra note 57, at 418 (2009) (citations omitted) (identifying four
categories of content restrictions in state film incentive programs: “(1) categorical; (2) negative
image; (3) implicit; and (4) carte blanche”). Ahmad also provides a comprehensive listing of the
content restrictions found in the various state incentive programs. See id. at 410–19.
94. See Machete Prods., L.L.C. v. Page, 809 F.3d 281, 285 (5th Cir. 2015) (explaining
that the Music, Film, Television and Multimedia Office assigned Incentive Program administration
to one of its divisions, the Texas Film Commission).
95. See Texas Moving Image Industry Incentive Program, TEX. FILM COMM’N,
https://gov.texas.gov/film/page/miiip [http://perma.cc/88HL-FCBU].
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and economic activity in [Texas]; and (2) the amount of a production
company’s in-state spending for a moving image project.”96 The Texas
Administrative Code provides that “[n]ot every project will qualify for a
grant,” and that the Commission “is not required to act on any grant
application.”97 In considering applications, “the Commission will
review the [production’s content] and advise the potential Applicant on
whether the content will preclude the project from receiving a grant.” 98
The Commission “may deny an application or eventual payment on an
application because of [a project’s] inappropriate content or content that
portrays Texas or Texans in a negative fashion, as determined by the
Commission.”99 Furthermore, “[i]n determining whether to act on or
deny [a grant] application, the Commission shall consider general
standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of
the citizens of Texas.”100
Finally, “the Commission will review the final content . . . to
determine if any substantial changes occurred during production” which
would lead to the grant’s denial. 101 If the Commission denies an
96. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 485.024(a) (West 2017). The Commission’s rules require
it to consider “the following criteria to assess, in the aggregate,” the project’s potential economic
impact on the State of Texas:
(A) The financial viability of the Applicant and the likelihood of successful project
execution and planned spending in the State of Texas;
(B) Proposed spending on existing state production infrastructure (such as
soundstages and industry vendors);
(C) The number of Texas jobs estimated to be created by the project;
(D) The ability to promote Texas as a tourist destination through the conduct of the
project and planned expenditure of funds;
(E) The magnitude of estimated expenditures in Texas; and
(F) Whether the project will be directed or produced by an individual who is a
Texas Resident (where the term ‘produced by’ is intended to encompass a nonhonorary producer with direct involvement in the day to day production of the
project, but above the level of line producer).
13 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §121.9(c)(3) (2017).
97. 1 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 121.4(b) (2017).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. 1 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 121.4(c) (2017).
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application, it will notify the applicant of the denial and “whether the
denial is based on failure to meet the minimum program requirements,
insufficient economic impact, or inappropriate content.”102 “Neither the
approval of the Qualifying Application nor any award of funds shall
obligate the Commission in any way to make any additional award of
funds.”103
Additionally, “all funding decisions made by the
Commission are final and are not subject to appeal.”104
With provisions such as these, Texas’ Incentive Program is
perhaps the most restrictive among all state incentive programs. 105
Texas statutes require a project script to be reviewed twice: a
preliminary review before production begins,106 and a final review once
production is complete. 107 Notably, “Texas has the strongest scriptreview component because it is the only state with the requirement in
statute.”108 Also, by withholding incentives until after the Commission
completes its second review, Texas differs from many other states
which typically pay incentives upfront to filmmakers.109 For these
reasons, filmmakers denied the incentives have challenged the Incentive
Program’s constitutionality in court. 110 Although the cases dealt with
Texas’ Incentive Program, their reasoning and conclusions, as discussed
below, could also apply to other states’ programs. Before analyzing
102. 13 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 121.9(c)(5) (2017).
103. Id.
104. 13 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 121.9(c)(6) (2017).
105. See Brice Wallace, The Screening Process: A Form of Censorship or a Way to
Safeguard Taxpayer Money?, DESERET NEWS (Nov. 16, 2008, 12:00 AM), http://www.deseretnews.
com/article/705263109/The-screening-process-A-form-of-censorship-or-a-way-to-safeguard-tax
payer-money.html? [http://perma.cc/6V7F-SG27].
106. 13 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §121.9(c) (2017).
107. See 1 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 121.4(b) (2017); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 485.022(f)
(West 2017).
108. Wallace, supra note 105.
109. Reeve Hamilton, Robert Rodriguez Film at Issue in Incentive Debate, TEXAS
TRIBUNE (Sept. 3, 2010, 5:00 AM), https://www.texastribune.org/2010/09/03/robert-rodriguezfilm-at-issue-in-incentive-debate/ [http://perma.cc/3E5U-MDD2].
110. Machete’s Chop Shop, Inc., v. Tex. Film Comm’n, 483 S.W.3d 272, 276 (Tex. Ct.
App. 2016); Machete Prods., L.L.C. v. Page, 809 F.3d 281, 286 (5th Cir. 2015).
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whether such provisions violate the First Amendment, however, this
article first outlines the relevant First Amendment doctrines and
precedents.
V. FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION FOR FILM:
A BRIEF OVERVIEW
In Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, the Supreme Court noted:
[M]otion pictures are a significant medium for the communication
of ideas. They may affect public attitudes and behavior in a variety
of ways, ranging from direct espousal of a political or social
doctrine to the subtle shaping of thought which characterizes all
artistic expression. The importance of motion pictures as an organ
of public opinion is not lessened by the fact that they are designed
to entertain as well as to inform.111

The Court went on to hold that the First Amendment protects
motion pictures.112 Such protection prohibits the government from
censoring or “restrict[ing] expression because of its message, ideas,
subject matter, or content.”113 As a result, “[d]iscrimination against
speech because of its message is presumed to be unconstitutional.” 114
Does this protection prohibit states from denying incentives to
filmmakers because of an objection to their film’s content? To help
answer that question, the following two parts examine two relevant First
Amendment doctrines: public forum and unconstitutional conditions.

111. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952).
112. Id.
113. Alicia M. Choi, National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley: A Dispute over the
“Decency and Respect” Provision, 32 AKRON L. REV. 327, 336 (1999); see also U.S. CONST.
amend. I; Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828–29 (1995).
114. Rosenberger 515 U.S. at 828 (citing Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Commc’ns
Comm’n, 512 U.S. 622, 641–643 (1994)).
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VI. THE PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE
A. Classifications of Public Fora
The Supreme Court uses forum analysis “to determine when a
governmental entity, in regulating property in its charge, may place
limitations on free speech.”115 There are three “types of fora: the
traditional public forum, the public forum created by government
designation, and the nonpublic [or limited] forum.” 116 In each forum,
certain standards limit government restrictions on free speech. 117
A traditional public forum is one, like a street or park, that “‘by
long tradition or by government fiat’ . . . has been ‘devoted to assembly
and debate.’”118 Courts apply strict scrutiny when the government seeks
to restrict speech in such a forum. 119 The government must show that
the restriction is necessary to serve a compelling government interest
and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. 120
Next, a designated public forum is one the government
“intentionally open[s] . . . for public discourse.”121 The government
may allow “for expressive activity by part or all of the public.” 122
However, if the government seeks to restrict speech in this forum,
courts apply strict scrutiny, just as with a traditional public forum. 123
Finally, a nonpublic or limited public forum is one the government
opens “limited to use by certain groups or dedicated solely to the
discussion of certain subjects.”124 Here, the government may impose
115. Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 679 (2010).
116. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985).
117. Id. at 800.
118. Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 667 (1988) (quotation
omitted).
119. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800.
120. Id.
121. Id. (citation omitted).
122. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992).
123. Id. at 678.
124. Christian Legal Soc’y, 561 U.S. at 679 n.11 (citation omitted).
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restrictions provided “the restrictions are ‘reasonable and [are] not an
effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the
speaker’s view.’”125 Furthermore, restrictions must be “reasonable in
light of the purpose served by the forum.” 126 Thus, speech restrictions
in a limited public forum are valid, so long as they are “reasonable and
viewpoint-neutral.”127
Although forums often consist of spaces where speakers may
gather to address others, not all forums involve physical property. 128
Speakers may, for instance, “seek access to some governmentcontrolled ‘channel[s] of communication.’” 129 When determining the
scope of a forum, the Court has held that the “focus [is] on the precise
‘access sought by the speaker.’”130 Thus, “any government-controlled
means of communication can qualify” as a forum, including “a charity
drive, a candidate debate, an internal mail system, and even the
expenditure of money to support private speech.”131 The fact that “[a]
public forum can be created by money, not just real estate” 132 is
significant to state film incentive programs, as discussed infra.
B. Cases Involving Government Funding of Private Speech and Forum
Creation
1. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia
provides an example of a public forum created by the government’s
125. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800 (alteration in original).
126. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106–07 (2001).
127. Christian Legal Soc’y, 561 U.S. at 679 n.11 (citation omitted).
128. Norman T. Deutsch, Does Anybody Really Need a Limited Public Forum?, 82 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 107, 119–120 (2008).
129. Id. at 119 (quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 801).
130. Id. (quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 801).
131. Id. at 120 (citations omitted).
132. Finley v. Nat’l Endowment for the Arts, 100 F.3d 671, 686 (9th Cir. 1996)
(Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (discussing Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508
U.S. 384 (1993)).
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disbursement of funds to certain groups. 133 In Rosenberger, the
University of Virginia provided reimbursement funds to certain student
groups for the printing of their publications. 134 These funds were
intended “to support a broad range of extracurricular student activities
. . . ‘related to the educational purposes of the University.’” 135 However,
the university denied fund payments to student groups engaged in
religious activities.136 The case involved a constitutional challenge to
this denial.137 The Supreme Court found that the government’s purpose
for providing these payments was “to encourage a diversity of views
from private speakers.”138 As a result, it created a limited public
forum. 139 Even though the payments were made from a fund that was
“a forum more in a metaphysical than in a spatial or geographic sense,
. . . the same principles [were] applicable.” 140 Thus, the Court held that
the university’s denial of funding to religious groups constituted
impermissible viewpoint-discrimination and, therefore, violated the
First Amendment. 141
2. National Endowment of the Arts v. Finley
Not all government funding of private speech creates a forum,
however. 142 When, unlike in Rosenberger, the government funds
private speech for a purpose other than encouraging viewpoint diversity,
courts have declined to apply the public forum doctrine. 143 For
133. See generally Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819
(1995).
134. Id. at 822–23.
135. Id. at 824.
136. Id.at 822–23.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 834.
139. Id. at 830.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 837.
142. Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 569 (1998).
143. See generally id.
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example, in National Endowment of the Arts v. Finley, the Court
considered the constitutionality of a statutory provision mandating that
the National Endowment for the Arts (“NEA”) use certain criteria in
assessing applications for government grants.144
The provision
specified that “artistic excellence and artistic merit are the criteria by
which [grant] applications are judged, taking into consideration general
standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of
the American public.”145
Congress enacted the above provision in response to public
concern that arose in 1989 over the NEA’s funding of two controversial
works.146 The first work, entitled “The Perfect Moment,” was “a 1989
retrospective of photographer Robert Mapplethorpe’s work” that
“included homoerotic photographs that several Members of Congress
condemned as pornographic.”147 To fund the project, the University of
Pennsylvania’s Institute of Contemporary Art used $30,000 of its NEAawarded visual arts grant.148 The second controversial piece of art,
Andres Serrano’s “Piss Christ”—”a photograph of a crucifix immersed
in urine”—was also funded by an NEA-supported organization’s
grant.149
In 1990, to address the concerns these controversies raised,
Congress amended the NEA provision to provide that “no NEA funds
‘may be used to promote, disseminate, or produce materials, which in
the judgment of [the NEA] may be considered obscene.’” 150 Congress
also adopted “[section] 954(d)(1), which directs the [NEA] Chairperson,
in establishing procedures to judge the artistic merit of grant
applications, ‘to tak[e] into consideration general standards of decency

144. Id. at 572.
145. Id. (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1) (1990)).
146. Id. at 574 (citing 135 CONG. REC. 22372).
147. Id. (citing 135 CONG. REC. 22372).
148. Id. (citing 135 CONG. REC. 22372).
149. Id. (citing 135 CONG. REC. 22372).
150. Id. at 575 (citing Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations
Act, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-121, 103 Stat. 701, 738–42 (1989)).
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and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American
public.’”151
National Endowment of the Arts v. Finley involved four artists
denied NEA grants in accordance with the new standards. 152 Joined by
the National Association of Artists’ Organizations, the artists brought a
facial challenge to section 954(d)(1), calling it “void for vagueness and
impermissibly viewpoint based.”153 On appeal to the Supreme Court,
after the district court and court of appeals both found the provision to
violate the First Amendment,154 respondents argued that the provision
amounts to “viewpoint discrimination because it rejects any artistic
speech that either fails to respect mainstream values or offends
standards of decency.”155 In his dissent, Justice Souter stated:
The NEA, like the student activities fund in Rosenberger, is a
subsidy scheme created to encourage expression of a diversity of
views from private speakers. . . . Given this congressional choice
to sustain freedom of expression, Rosenberger teaches that the First
Amendment forbids decisions based on viewpoint popularity. So
long as Congress chooses to subsidize expressive endeavors at
large, it has no business requiring the NEA to turn down funding
applications of artists and exhibitors who devote their “freedom of
thought, imagination, and inquiry” to defying our tastes, our
beliefs, or our values. It may not use the NEA’s purse to
“suppres[s] . . . dangerous ideas.”156

The Finley majority, however, disagreed with Justice Souter on
this point and determined that Rosenberger did not apply.157 Instead, it
held that the NEA’s disbursements of funds required the organization to
151. Id. at 577 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1) (1990)).
152. Id. at 569.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 578.
155. Id. at 580.
156. Id. at 613–14 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Regan v. Taxation with Representation
of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 548 (1983)).
157. Id. at 586.
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make “esthetic judgments” in applying its “inherently content-based
‘excellence’ threshold for NEA support.”158 This threshold, the Court
noted, distinguished Finley
from the subsidy at issue in Rosenberger—which was available to
all student organizations that were “‘related to the educational
purpose of the University’”—and from comparably objective
decisions on allocating public benefits, such as access to a school
auditorium or a municipal theater, or the second class mailing
privileges available to “‘all newspapers and other periodical
publications.’”159

Furthermore, the Court noted, NEA grants are limited, requiring
the NEA to fund only “the worthiest projects submitted for grants.”160
The Court made clear, however, that it was not the scarcity of NEA
funding that distinguished the case from Rosenberger, but “the
competitive process according to which the grants are allocated.” 161
This process required NEA panelists to make subjective decisions about
which projects “deserve funding compared to the proposals of other
grant seekers.”162 As the Court saw it, “[i]n the context of arts funding,
in contrast to many other subsidies, the Government does not
indiscriminately ‘encourage a diversity of views from private
speakers.’”163

158. Id.
159. Id. (citations and quotations omitted).
160. David Hungerford, Note, The Fallacy of Finley:
Public Fora, Viewpoint
Discrimination, and the NEA, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 249, 276 (1999) (citing Finley v. Nat’l
Endowment for the Arts, 795 F. Supp. 1457, 1575 (C.D. Cal. 1992), aff’d, 100 F.3d 671 (9th Cir.
1996), rev’d, 118 S. Ct. 2168 (1998) (observing that NEA funds are a limited resource)).
161. Finley, 524 U.S. at 586.
162. Hungerford, supra note 160, at 276 (citing Finley, 524 U.S. at 586 (noting that NEA
makes funding decisions through the use of the competitive process)).
163. Finley, 524 U.S. at 586 (citing Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515
U.S. 819, 834–35 (1995)). According to one commentator, “the Court seemed to suggest that the
point of the program is to encourage good art regardless of whether it leads to a public forum-like
environment. Thus, for the majority, diversity of viewpoint in NEA funded art would seem to be
more of a happy by-product of the program than its intended goal.” Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., NEA
v. Finley: A Decision in Search of a Rationale, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 14 (1999).
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The Court also found it significant that the NEA interpreted the
“decency and respect” provision as not an “absolute restriction,” but
instead, “as merely hortatory.” 164 According to the NEA, the provision
“adds ‘considerations’ to the grant-making process; it does not preclude
awards to projects that might be deemed ‘indecent’ or ‘disrespectful,’
nor place conditions on grants, or even specify that those factors must
be given any particular weight in reviewing an application.” 165 The
Court agreed with the NEA, observing that “the text of [section]
954(d)(1) imposes no categorical requirement.” 166 Instead, the text
operates as “advisory language” that warns the NEA to take “decency
and respect” into consideration. 167 This “advisory language,” the Court
observed, “stands in sharp contrast to congressional efforts to prohibit
the funding of certain classes of speech. When Congress has in fact
intended to affirmatively constrain the NEA’s grant-making authority, it
has done so in no uncertain terms.”168 As an example, the Court pointed
to Congress’ prohibition on the NEA’s funding of obscenity in which
Congress clearly states that obscenity “shall not be funded.” 169 The
Court concluded that “the ‘decency and respect’ criteria do not silence
speakers by expressly ‘threatening censorship of ideas.’” 170
In a later case, the Court characterized its Finley decision, stating:
[In Finley], we upheld an art funding program that required the
National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) to use content-based
criteria in making funding decisions. We explained that “any
content-based considerations that may be taken into account in the
grant-making process are a consequence of the nature of arts
funding.” In particular, “[t]he very assumption of the NEA is that
grants will be awarded according to the ‘artistic worth of competing
applicants,’ and absolute neutrality is simply inconceivable.” We
expressly declined to apply forum analysis, reasoning that it would

164. Finley, 524 U.S. at 580.
165. Id. at 580–81.
166. Id. at 581.
167. Id. at 582.
168. Id. at 581.
169. Id. (discussing 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(2)).
170. Id. at 583 (citation omitted).
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conflict with “NEA’s mandate . . . to make esthetic judgments, and
the inherently content-based ‘excellence’ threshold for NEA
support.”171

C. Forum Analysis and Film Incentive Program Restrictions
The Supreme Court decisions in Rosenberger and Finley suggest
that forum analysis is likely inappropriate when considering film
incentive program restrictions. In Rosenberger, the funding program’s
purpose was to encourage a diversity of views from private speakers. 172
State film incentive programs, on the other hand, serve to encourage
economic activity and growth in the state. 173 This is accomplished, in
part, by providing grants to films that will attract tourism and other
economic activity by presenting the state in a positive light.174 Thus, a
state may require its film incentive program to determine funding based
on how the film portrays the state. 175 This closely parallels Finley,
where the statutory provision required the NEA to make subjective,
content-based decisions when awarding funding.176 Because film
incentive programs resemble the funding guidelines in Finley, as
opposed to those in Rosenberger, the public forum doctrine and its
prohibitions against discrimination would seem inapplicable in
challenges to film incentive program restrictions.
VII. THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS DOCTRINE
In considering incentive programs as a form of government
benefit, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine may be more applicable
here than forum doctrine. Under the unconstitutional conditions
171. United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 205 (2003) (quoting Finley, 524
U.S. at 586).
172. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 821.
173. Zach Huitink, An Update on State Film Industry Incentives, THE COUNCIL OF STATE
GOV’TS (June 15, 2011, 12:02 PM), http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/content/update-state-filmindustry-incentives [https://perma.cc/K5R8-H9V6].
174. Id.
175. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 485.024(a) (West 2017).
176. Finley, 524 U.S. at 586.
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doctrine, “the government ‘may not deny a benefit to a person on a
basis that infringes his constitutionally protected . . . freedom of speech’
even if he has no entitlement to that benefit.” 177 The Supreme Court has
“made clear that even though a person has no ‘right’ to a valuable
governmental benefit and even though the government may deny him
the benefit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon
which the government may not rely.” 178 For example, the government
may not rely on a reason that infringes upon a person’s constitutionallyprotected free speech right.179 If the government were able to deny a
person benefits based on that person’s speech, then that person’s
“exercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited.
This would allow the government to ‘produce a result which [it] could
not command directly.’”180
A. The Supreme Court Addresses Government Funding and
Unconstitutional Conditions
In Rust v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court applied the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine. 181 Rust involved a challenge to a prohibition on
government funding of family-planning clinics that advocated for,
counseled about, or made referrals for abortions. 182 Title X of the
Public Health Services Act provides federal funding for family-planning
services, but prohibits that funding from going to programs that
included abortion as a family-planning method. 183 Fund recipients are
177. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674 (1996) (citing Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)).
178. Perry, 408 U.S. at 597.
179. Id.
180. Id. (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)) (noting that the Supreme
Court has applied the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to the denial of a variety of government
benefits, including tax exemptions, unemployment benefits, welfare payments, and government
employment).
181. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 173 (1991).
182. See David Cole, Beyond Unconstitutional Conditions: Charting Spheres of
Neutrality in Government-Funded Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 675, 684 (1992) (citing 42 C.F.R. §
59.10(a) (1991)).
183. Rust, 500 U.S. at 173.
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expressly prohibited from referring clients to an abortion provider, even
if the client requested the referral.184 The statute also prohibits
recipients from engaging in activities that “encourage, promote or
advocate abortion as a method of family planning.” 185
Title X recipients and doctors, who supervised Title X-funded
projects, challenged these restrictions. They contended that the
restrictions are unconstitutional “because they condition the receipt of a
benefit, in [this case government] funding, on the relinquishment of a
constitutional right, the right to engage in abortion advocacy and
counseling.”186 The restrictions constitute impermissible viewpoint
discrimination, they argued, because Title X prohibits “‘all discussion
about abortion as a lawful option.’” 187
In upholding Title X’s restrictions on abortion-related speech, the
Supreme Court observed that “when the Government appropriates
public funds to establish a program, it is entitled to define the limits of
that program.”188 The Court explained:
The Government can, without violating the Constitution,
selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities it
believes to be in the public interest, without at the same time
funding an alternative program which seeks to deal with the
problem in another way. In so doing, the Government has not
discriminated on the basis of viewpoint; it has merely chosen to
fund one activity to the exclusion of the other.189

Consequently, the Court held, a provision requiring “that federal
funds will be used only to further the purposes of a grant does not
violate constitutional rights.”190

184. Id. at 180.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 196.
187. Id. at 192 (quotation omitted).
188. Id. at 194.
189. Id. at 193.
190. Id. at 198.
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The Rust Court found it significant that the restriction only applies
to speech within the government-funded program and not to speech by
program participants outside of that program. 191
Finding the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine inapplicable here, the Court
observed that “the Government is not denying a benefit to anyone, but is
instead simply insisting that public funds be spent for the purposes for
which they were authorized.” 192 “‘[U]nconstitutional conditions’
cases,” the Court explained, “involve situations in which the
Government has placed a condition on the recipient of the subsidy
rather than on a particular program or service, thus effectively
prohibiting the recipient from engaging in the protected conduct outside
the scope of the federally funded program.”193 It is true, the Court
continued, that “employees’ freedom of expression is limited during the
time that they actually work for the [government-funded] project; but
this limitation is a consequence of their decision to accept employment
in a project, the scope of which is permissibly restricted by the funding
authority.”194 In other words, “while family planning counselors may
have a constitutional right to talk about abortion, they have no
constitutional right to do so while being funded by the government.”195
Rust established that when the government subsidizes speech, it
may favor one viewpoint over another, provided subsidy recipients are
allowed to espouse the disfavored viewpoint outside the subsidized
program.196 As the Court observed, “‘[a] refusal to fund protected
activity, without more, cannot be equated with the imposition of a
“penalty” on that activity.’”197 Likewise, “a legislature’s decision not to
subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe the
right.”198 “The reasoning of these decisions is simple: ‘although

191. Id. at 199 n.5.
192. Id. at 196.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 199.
195. Cole, supra note 182, at 676 n.172.
196. See generally Rust, 500 U.S. at 193–200.
197. Id. (quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317 n.19 (1980)).
198. Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 549 (1983).
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government may not place obstacles in the path of a [person’s] exercise
of . . . freedom of [speech], it need not remove those not of its own
creation.’”199 Therefore, it is “well established that the government can
make content-based distinctions when it subsidizes speech,” 200 as
“subsidies, by definition . . . do not restrict any speech.”201
B. The Rust Holding and Film Incentive Program Restrictions
Applying the reasoning in Rust to film incentive program
restrictions, it would seem that such restrictions would be found valid
under the First Amendment. Film incentive programs are created for
specific purposes: to spur employment and economic activity, to build
and strengthen the production industry within a state, and to attract
tourism. 202 They are not created to support private speakers. 203 The
Texas statute, for example, provides that the Texas Film Commission’s
method for determining grants must, at a minimum, consider: “(1) the
current and likely future effect a moving image project will have on
employment, tourism, and economic activity in [Texas]; and (2) the
amount of a production company’s in-state spending for a moving
image project.”204 The statute also provides that the office “may deny
an application because of [a film’s] inappropriate content or content that
portrays Texas or Texans in a negative fashion, as determined by the
office.”205 Much of this standard focuses on economic criteria, such as
the amount of money a production will spend in the state, how many
199. Id. at 549–50 (citation omitted).
200. Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass’n, 551 U.S. 177, 188–89 (2007).
201. Ariz. Free Enter. Club v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 765 (2011) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
202. See Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 588 (1998) (quoting 20
U.S.C. § 951(5) (1990)).
203. The purpose of the program was also a relevant factor in Finley. There the majority
observed that “[i]n the 1990 Amendments that incorporated § 954(d)(1), Congress modified the
declaration of purpose in the NEA’s enabling act to provide that arts funding should ‘contribute
to public support and confidence in the use of taxpayer funds,’ and that ‘public funds . . . must
ultimately serve public purposes the Congress defines.’” Id. (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 951(5)). This
could have been an additional factor in the Court’s decision to uphold the “decency and respect”
provision at issue in that case.
204. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 485.024(a) (West 2017).
205. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 485.022(e) (West 2017).
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people it will employ, and the types of jobs it will create. 206 The way
the film depicts the state and its residents and the production’s tourism
and economic impact are merely additional factors to be considered. 207
As Rust illustrates, the government may impose viewpoint-based
restrictions on the granting of subsidies provided recipients remain free
to say what they wish outside the confines of the program. 208 Such is
the case here. Filmmakers remain free to make their films even if
denied an incentive program grant. Thus, Texas’ exercise of viewpoint
discrimination in the granting of film incentives, to carry out the
purposes of its subsidy program, does not necessarily violate the First
Amendment.
This is not to say that film incentive program
administrators may engage in all types of viewpoint discrimination. In
his dissenting opinion in Finley, Justice Souter criticized the Court’s
application of Rust to the facts before it: Although the Court in Rust
“‘recognized that when the government appropriates public funds to
promote a particular policy of its own, it is entitled to say what it
wishes.’”209 The Court, Souter continues,
added the important qualifying language that “this is not to suggest
that funding by the Government, even when coupled with the
freedom of the fund recipients to speak outside the scope of the
Government-funded project, is invariably sufficient to justify
Government control over the content of expression.” Indeed,
outside of the contexts of government-as-buyer and government-asspeaker, [the Court has] held time and time again that Congress
may not “discriminate invidiously in its subsidies in such a way as
to aim at the suppression of . . . ideas.”210

206. See 13 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §121.9(c)(3) (2017).
207. See id.
208. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 198–99.
209. Finley, 524 U.S. at 612 n.7 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector &
Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995) (citing Rust, 500 U.S. at 194)).
210. Id. (citing Regan, 461 U.S. at 548)); see also Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union
Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 384 (1993) (holding that when the government subsidizes private
speech, it may not “favor some viewpoints or ideas at the expense of others”); Hannegan v.
Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146, 149 (1946) (holding that the Postmaster General may not deny
subsidies to certain periodicals on the ground that they are “morally improper and not for the
public welfare and the public good”).
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While the government has considerable leeway to restrict to whom
it issues subsidies, as Justice Souter and Rust indicate, that leeway in
not unlimited. Part VIII considers where that limit lies.
VIII.THE FIRST AMENDMENT’S APPLICABILITY
TO GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES
In his dissent in the Finley appellate court decision, Justice
Kleinfeld discussed two cases that provide some guidance here. 211 In
one of those cases, Bullfrog Films, Inc. v. Wick,212 the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals “held that customs duties exemptions for any
educational or cultural materials could not exclude propaganda films
based on their content and viewpoint.” 213 In the other case, Big Mama
Rag, Inc. v. United States,214 the D.C. Circuit held that “a tax exemption
generally available to educational organizations could not be denied
based on a regulation requiring full and fair exposition of facts enabling
a reader to draw an independent conclusion.” 215 According to Justice
Kleinfeld, the reason that the denials of benefits in these cases were
found to be unconstitutional was because, “[u]nder these cases, all
applicants in the class were entitled to the financial benefit from the
government, unless the content of their speech was contrary to
government standards.”216 Justice Kleinfeld contrasted this with the arts
subsidies in Finley, in which “no applicant is entitled to the financial
benefit.”217 Thus, where a government benefit is available to all of a
class or category’s members, it may be unconstitutional to deny the
benefit based on the content of one’s speech. This is consistent with

211. Finley v. Nat’l Endowment for the Arts, 100 F.3d 671, 684 (9th Cir. 1996)
(Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
212. Bullfrog Films, Inc. v. Wick, 847 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1988).
213. Finley, 100 F.3d at 686 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (citing Bullfrog Films, 847 F.2d
502).
214. Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States, 631 F.2d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
215. Finley, 100 F.3d at 686 (citing Big Mama Rag, 631 F.2d 1030).
216. Id.
217. Id.
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Rosenberger’s holding.218 On the other hand, consistent with Finley,
when the benefit is only available to a limited number of a class or
category’s members, then denial of the benefit based on content may be
constitutional.
The opinion in Advocates for the Arts v. Thomson elaborated on
this point.219 There, the issue was the denial of “an NEA grant to a
literary magazine because the governor and state arts commission
thought a poem it published was indecent.” 220 In its rejection of the
First Amendment challenge, the First Circuit explained that “denial of a
grant was not suppression of speech, and the grant selection process
necessarily discriminated based on content.” 221 The court explained:
Public funding of the arts seeks “not to abridge, restrict, or censor
speech, but rather to use public money to facilitate and enlarge”
artistic expression. A disappointed grant applicant cannot complain
that his work has been suppressed, but only that another’s has been
promoted in its stead. The decision to withhold support is
unavoidably based in some part on the “subject matter” or
“content” of expression, for the very assumption of public funding
of the arts is that decisions will be made according to the literary or
artistic worth of competing applicants.222

In summarizing this decision’s significance, Justice Kleinfeld noted that
just because all denied grant applicants have the same freedom of
expression right, that does not mean that all denied grant applicants can
properly bring suit alleging First Amendment violations.223

218. See generally Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819
(1995).
219. See generally Advocates for the Arts v. Thomson, 532 F.2d 792 (1st Cir. 1976).
220. Finley, 100 F.3d at 685 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (citing Advocates for the Arts, 532
F.2d at 795).
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
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Thus, the requirement of “absolute neutrality” does not apply to
public grants for speech-related activities as it does in a public forum. 224
The Supreme Court offered guidance on this point:
[W]hile it may be feasible to allocate space in an auditorium
without consideration of the expressive content of competing
applicants’ productions, such neutrality in a program for public
funding of the arts is inconceivable. The purpose of such a
program is to promote “art,” the very definition of which requires
an exercise of judgment from case to case. . . . Solutions that may
work for an auditorium, such as scheduling on a first-come-firstserved basis or upon a prescribed showing of likely box-office
success (if that is a solution), are simply not available to a program
for funding the arts. If such a program is to fulfill its purpose, the
exercise of editorial judgment by those administering it is
inescapable.225

Different constitutional standards, then, apply to speech subsidies
than to speech regulation. 226 The justification for this is that
“[r]egulations directly restrict speech; subsidies do not. Subsidies, it is
true, may indirectly abridge speech, but only if the funding scheme is
‘manipulated’ to have a ‘coercive effect’ on those who do not hold the
subsidized position.”227 However, proving a “coercive effect” by a
limited spending program that does not constitute a public forum,
is virtually impossible, because simply denying a subsidy “does not
‘coerce’ belief,” and because the criterion of unconstitutionality is
whether denial of the subsidy threatens “to drive certain ideas or
viewpoints from the marketplace.” Absent such a threat, “the
Government may allocate . . . funding according to criteria that

224. Advocates for the Arts, 532 F.2d at 796.
225. Id.
226. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 552 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted).
227. Id. at 552–53 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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would be impermissible were direct regulation of speech or a
criminal penalty at stake.”228

A. Vagueness
This leniency for speech subsidies, that is prohibited for speech
regulation, also applies to vagueness concerns regarding subsidy-award
standards.229 Generally speaking, vague laws—those that do not clearly
articulate their application’s standards or the speech to be restricted—
are void.230 This is so for several reasons. First, a vague law “may ‘trap
the innocent by not providing fair warning’” about what the law
forbids. 231 Additionally, a vague law allows law enforcement to
interpret it subjectively, leading to the “‘arbitrary and discriminatory
application’” of the law.232 A vague law can also chill speech for fear
that the speech may violate the law: “[u]ncertain meanings inevitably
lead citizens to ‘“steer far wider of the unlawful zone” . . . than if the
boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked.’” 233
Even though vagueness is generally not permitted in a regulation,
some vagueness may be permitted in the creation of subsidies. 234 For
example, in Finley, the “decency and respect” provision was challenged
for vagueness. 235 In his dissent in the Finley appellate court decision,
Justice Kleinfeld, who seemingly would have upheld the provisions’
constitutionality, remarked:
Artists seeking grants have no property right to them, and their
liberty to express themselves as they choose is not regulated by the
228. Id. (alteration in original).
229. See id.
230. Bullfrog Films, 847 F.2d at 512 (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104,
108–09 (1972)).
231. Id. (quoting Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108).
232. Id. (quoting Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108–09).
233. Id. (quoting Grayned, 408 U.S. at 109).
234. Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 588–89 (1998).
235. Id. at 589.

TIMMER

74

3/22/2018 8:01 PM

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:1

grants. Vagueness law has been developed under the Fifth
Amendment to protect people from the taking of liberty or property
without fair notice of what they may not do, and without protection
against arbitrary enforcement.
First Amendment vagueness
doctrine applies to government action relating to speech if the
government regulates speech or conditions a generally available
benefit upon the content of speech. An artist applying for an NEA
grant has no formula, and is not entitled to one, for the painting or
performance which will produce a grant. None of the purposes of
vagueness law apply to prizes.236

Although such provisions’ terms would likely raise vagueness
concerns in a regulatory framework or criminal statute context, the
Supreme Court in Finley concluded that the provision was not
unconstitutionally vague. 237 The Court reasoned that, in the context of
these arts grants, speakers likely would not be deterred from engaging
in particular speech. 238 Despite the Court’s recognition of such criteria’
potential chilling effect, it determined that “when the Government is
acting as patron rather than as sovereign, the consequences of
imprecision are not constitutionally severe.” 239 Thus, “although the
First Amendment certainly has application in the subsidy context, . . .
the Government may allocate competitive funding according to criteria
that would be impermissible were direct regulation of speech or a
criminal penalty at stake.”240 This applies to both vagueness and
viewpoint discrimination. 241

236. Finley, 100 F.3d at 689 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
237. Finley, 524 U.S. at 588–89 (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432–33 (1963))
(noting that “[u]nder the First and Fifth Amendments, speakers are protected from arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement of vague standards”)).
238. Id. at 588 (citations omitted).
239. Id. at 589–90 (citations omitted) (noting that “[i]n the context of selective subsidies,
it is not always feasible for Congress to legislate with clarity,” and that “[s]ection 954(d)(1)
merely adds some imprecise considerations to an already subjective selection process[;] [i]t does
not, on its face, impermissibly infringe on First or Fifth Amendment rights”).
240. Id. at 587–88 (citing Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540,
587–88 (1983)).
241. See id. at 588–89.

TIMMER

2018]

3/22/2018 8:01 PM

THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND CONTENT RESTRICTIONS

75

B. Viewpoint Discrimination
In Finley, there was no allegation of “discrimination in any
particular funding decision.”242 Thus, the Court had “no occasion . . . to
address an as-applied challenge in a situation where the denial of a grant
may be shown to be the product of invidious viewpoint
discrimination.”243 The Court therefore upheld the constitutionality of
the provision, “[u]nless and until § 954(d)(1) [the ‘decency and respect
provision’] is applied in a manner that raises concern about the
suppression of disfavored viewpoints.” 244 “If the NEA were to leverage
its power to award subsidies on the basis of subjective criteria into a
penalty on disfavored viewpoints,” the Court explained, “then we would
confront a different case. We have stated that, even in the provision of
subsidies, the Government may not ‘aim at the suppression of
dangerous ideas,’ and if a subsidy were ‘manipulated’ to have a
‘coercive effect,’ then relief could be appropriate.” 245
In what situation, then, does the denial of a subsidy “aim at the
suppression of dangerous ideas,” such that it is “manipulated” to have a
“coercive effect?” The following two cases, which found this effect to
have occurred, may provide the answer.
IX. FIRST AMENDMENT VIOLATIONS IN ARTS FUNDING CASES
A. New York City Withholds Funds
as a Result of an Objectionable Art Exhibit
In Brooklyn Institute of Arts and Sciences v. City of New York, an
art exhibit generated controversy when it was first shown in London. 246
Entitled “Sensation:
Young British Artists from the Saatchi
Collection,” the exhibit featured “90 works from the collection of
British advertising magnate Charles Saatchi,” including:
242. Id. at 586 (noting that, “[i]n fact, after filing suit to challenge § 954(d)(1), two of the
individual respondents received NEA grants”).
243. Id. at 587.
244. Id.
245. Id. (citing Regan, 461 U.S. at 550); Ark. Writers’ Project v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221,
237 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
246. Brooklyn Inst. of Arts & Scis. v. City of New York, 64 F. Supp. 2d 184, 190
(E.D.N.Y. 1999).

TIMMER

76

3/22/2018 8:01 PM

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:1

Damien Hirst’s “A Thousand Years,” composed of flies, maggots, a
cow’s head, sugar, and water[;] another Hirst work, “This Little
Piggy went to Market, This Little Piggy Stayed Home,” a split pig
carcass floating in formaldehyde; Marc Quinn’s[] “Self,” a bust of
the artist made from nine pints of his frozen blood; and, most
controversial, artist Chris Ofili’s work, titled “The Holy Virgin
Mary[]” . . . —a depiction of a black Madonna adorned with
elephant dung and sexually-explicit photos.247

In 1999, the controversy followed the exhibit to the United States when
the Brooklyn Museum prepared to showcase it on a temporary basis.248
The City of New York provided funding to the Brooklyn Museum
for operational purposes, but generally not “‘for direct curatorial or
artistic services’” or for the exhibit at issue. 249 Nevertheless, the city
threatened to terminate all the museum’s funding “unless it canceled the
Exhibit.”250 The city found particularly objectionable Chris Ofili’s “The
Holy Virgin Mary,” made of elephant dung, among other materials, and
containing “small photographs of buttocks and female genitalia
scattered on the background.” 251 New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani,
speaking publicly, called the exhibit “sick” and “disgusting.”252
Giuliani singled out “The Holy Virgin Mary” as being “offensive to
Catholics” and “an attack on religion.” 253 Explaining the city’s threat to
terminate the museum’s funding, Giuliani declared:
You don’t have a right to a government subsidy to desecrate
someone else’s religion. And therefore we will do everything that
we can to remove funding from the [Museum] until the [Museum]
director comes to his senses. And realizes that if you are a

247. The
Art
of
Controversy,
PBS
(Oct.
8,
1999,
12:00
AM),
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/entertainment-july-dec99-art_10-8/ [http://perma.cc/Z7F3-DJGR].
248. See generally Brooklyn Inst. of Arts., 64 F. Supp. 2d at 184.
249. Id. at 184, 189 (quotation omitted).
250. Id. at 191.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 186.
253. Id.
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government subsidized enterprise then you can’t do things that
desecrate the most personal and deeply held views of the people in
society. 254

The museum refused to cancel the exhibit, leading the city to
withhold “funds already appropriated to the Museum for operating
expenses and maintenance and [file suit seeking] to eject the Museum
from the City-owned land and building in which the Museum’s
collections [had] been housed for over one hundred years.”255 In
response, the museum filed suit against both the city and the mayor
“seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, to prevent the defendants
from punishing or retaliating against the Museum for displaying the
Exhibit, in violation of the Museum’s rights under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments.”256
In reviewing the case, the district court found that “the facts
establish[ed] an ongoing effort by the Mayor and the City to coerce the
Museum into relinquishing its First Amendment rights.”257 The court
referred to the Supreme Court’s “unconstitutional conditions” principle,
noting that although a person is not entitled to a government benefit, the
government “may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes
his constitutionally protected interests—especially, his interest in
freedom of speech.”258 Here, the City of New York had forced the
museum to choose between obtaining a financial benefit and enjoying
its First Amendment rights.259 In condemning the city’s actions, the
court held that by removing the Museum’s funding, the city
“discriminate[d] invidiously in its subsidies in such a way as to ‘aim at
the suppression of dangerous ideas.’”260 The court recognized that the
government’s purpose is the determining factor in deciding whether
254. Id. at 191 (quoting New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani).
255. Id. at 186.
256. Id. at 191–92.
257. Id. at 198.
258. Id. at 199 (quoting Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)).
259. Id. at 200.
260. Id. (quoting Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 548
(1983)).
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speech restrictions constitute viewpoint discrimination. 261 Here, the
government’s purpose was clear; the City of New York confirmed that
its purpose for removing the museum’s funding was directly related to
the viewpoints expressed in “The Holy Virgin Mary.”262 Accordingly,
the city’s conduct unequivocally violated the First Amendment. 263
The court distinguished its present situation from that in Finley,
where the Court found a provision adding “decency and respect”
considerations to be constitutional. 264 In doing so, the Court “did ‘not
perceive a realistic danger’ that [the provision would] be used ‘to
effectively preclude or punish the expression of particular views.’”265
According to the Brooklyn Institute court, the difference was that Finley
involved “considerations” contemplated when deciding whether to
award a grant, which did not facially constitute viewpoint
discrimination.266 The provisions in Finley also “‘[did] not preclude
awards to projects that might be deemed “indecent” or “disrespectful”
nor place conditions on grants.’”267 In Brooklyn Institute, however, the
City of New York had already appropriated the museum’s funding and
withdrew it because it objected to an exhibit’s content. 268
B. San Antonio Defunds Community Arts Center
Due to Objectionable Programming
Similar to Brooklyn Institute, Esperanza Peace and Justice Center
v. City of San Antonio involved a public campaign protesting the City of
San Antonio’s funding of a community arts center that produced gay

261. Id. (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).
262. Id. at 191, 200.
263. Id. at 200.
264. Id. at 202.
265. Id. (quoting Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 569 (1998)).
266. Id.
267. Id. (quoting Finley, 524 U.S. at 569).
268. Id.
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and lesbian-oriented programming. 269 Under public pressure, the San
Antonio City Council voted to eliminate the city’s funding of the arts
center.270
Known as the Esperanza Peace and Justice Center
(“Esperanza”), the center offered a wide variety of programming and
provided assistance and workspace to various local artists and
organizations.271 The city funded Esperanza from 1990 to 1997 through
a program that provided assistance to various arts organizations. 272 As
part of that program, the city encouraged participants to merge art with
social issues.273
During 1997 and 1998, as the city council focused on its yearly
budgets, lobbyists sought to eliminate Esperanza’s funding due to its
“perceived advocacy of the ‘gay and lesbian lifestyle.’” 274 Lobbyists
also targeted the San Antonio Lesbian & Gay Media Project (“Media
Project”), which, together with Esperanza, co-sponsored “Out at the
Movies,” an annual lesbian and gay film festival. 275 Adam McManus, a
Christian talk-radio host who took a prominent role in the campaign
against Esperanza, interviewed several city council members on his
show. 276 McManus, his listeners, and his interviewees displayed
negative attitudes towards Esperanza and its funding, mainly due to
Esperanza’s support of the “Out at the Movies” festival. 277
The Christian Pro-Life Foundation also took part in the campaign
against Esperanza, sending flyers—singling out Esperanza by name and
calling for opposition to city funding of similar programs—to 1,200 of

269. Esperanza Peace & Justice Ctr. v. City of San Antonio, 316 F. Supp. 2d 433 (W.D.
Tex. 2001).
270. Id. at 440–44.
271. Id. at 436–37.
272. Id. at 439.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 440, 443–44.
275. Id. at 437, 440.
276. Id. at 440–41 (citation omitted).
277. Id. (citation omitted).
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its supporters, including city council members. 278 Council members
also received various communications opposing funding of Esperanza,
largely due to Esperanza’s promotion of the “homosexual agenda.”279
Aside from these communications, “[t]he majority of the eleven council
members had no personal knowledge regarding Esperanza or its
programming beyond what they were told by constituents or gathered
from news reports.”280
In 1997, the San Antonio Department of Art and Cultural Affairs
(“DACA”) recommended funding for Esperanza and Media Project, but
the city council nevertheless eliminated both groups’ funding. 281 The
city also cut funding to a third organization affiliated with Esperanza. 282
This was the first time the city had entirely eliminated funding to an
organization for which DACA had recommended funds
appropriation.283 In 1998, the city again denied Esperanza and Media
Project’s funding requests.284 Esperanza and Media Project challenged
the city’s funding denials as “viewpoint discrimination in violation of
their free speech rights under the First Amendment,” and a “violation of
their equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.” 285
The district court began its analysis by articulating a “fundamental
First Amendment principle—that government may not proscribe speech
or expressive conduct because it disapproves of the ideas expressed.” 286
The court pointed to Finley where “the Supreme Court made clear that
the First Amendment forbids ‘invidious viewpoint discrimination’ in the
278. Id. (citation omitted).
279. Id. (citation omitted).
280. Id. at 441 (citations omitted).
281. Id. at 442.
̅N, an
282. Id. at 438–39 (explaining that the 1997 budget also eliminated funding for VA
organization whose purpose was to “bring[] national and international artists who are visiting or
working in other parts of Texas to San Antonio for programs and networking,” and that
̅N in its grant applications with the city).
Esperanza had acted as a sponsor and fiscal agent for VA
283. Id. at 442.
284. Id. at 443–44.
̅N also joined the challenge. Id. at 433.
285. Id. at 436. VA
286. Id. at 444 (citing W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 644 (1943)).

TIMMER

2018]

3/22/2018 8:01 PM

THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND CONTENT RESTRICTIONS

81

arts subsidy context” and that “‘[e]ven in the provision of subsidies, the
government may not aim at the suppression of dangerous ideas.’” 287
Turning to the case before it, the court observed that “[t]he clearest
example of viewpoint discrimination is that alleged here: the denial of
government funding because the applicant espouses an unpopular,
controversial, or uncommon viewpoint.” 288 The court held that the
city’s “decision to refuse all funding to an applicant because of
disapproval of one program or presentation [was] a form of viewpoint
discrimination.”289
San Antonio attempted to justify its decision to deny funding on
grounds that Esperanza was either a political organization or simply
“too political,” arguing that “arts funds should be reserved for arts
groups, not political groups.”290 The court rejected this argument: “We
should be most vigilant whenever a government official undertakes to
restrict speech because it is too ‘political.’ Labeling expression as
‘political’ can often serve as proxy for suppression of unfavored
ideas.”291 Applying that vigilance, the court found the city’s argument
to be a pretext, observing that Esperanza’s political nature had never
before been a factor in all the years the city had provided it funding. 292
Besides, the court observed, one of the grant program’s goals was to
support programs addressing social and political concerns. 293

287. Id. at 446 (quoting Finley, 524 U.S. at 586).
288. Id. at 447 (citing Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,
829 (1995) (defining “viewpoint” as “the specific motivating ideology or the opinion or
perspective of the speaker”); Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S.
384, 393 (1993) (finding viewpoint discrimination where school “permitted school property to be
used for the presentation of all views about family issues and child rearing except those dealing
with the subject matter from a religious standpoint”); R.A.V. v. City of Saint Paul, 505 U.S. 377,
384 (1992) (holding that the government may not “proscribe only libel critical of the
government”)).
289. Esperanza Peace & Justice Ctr., 316 F. Supp. 2d at 447 (citing Brooklyn Inst. of
Arts, 64 F. Supp. 2d at 184); Cuban Museum of Arts & Culture v. City of Miami, 766 F. Supp.
1121, 1129 (S.D. Fla. 1991).
290. Esperanza Peace & Justice Ctr., 316 F. Supp. 2d at 456.
291. Id.
292. See id. at 458, 465.
293. Id. at 457–58 (citations omitted).
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As another justification, the city pointed to its constituents’
opposition to the funding of “groups ‘advocating a gay and lesbian
lifestyle,’”294 and its council’s “right and . . . obligation to listen to
constituent opinion in making arts funding decisions.”295 While the
court acknowledged this to be “true,” it noted that the city’s “voters
cannot require the council to deny funding to an arts group merely
because that group promotes a social or political viewpoint those voters
find objectionable.”296 Pointing to certain council members’ public
statements about Esperanza’s gay-themed programming and the
decision to defund it, the court found that seven out of eleven council
members were motivated, at least in part, “to defund Esperanza because
of its constitutionally-protected conduct.”297 With the city unable “to
show that it would have made the same decision absent [Esperanza’s
and Media Project’s] viewpoints,”298 the court determined that
Esperanza was defunded “because of [their] constitutionally-protected
expressions of viewpoint.”299 The court therefore held that the city
engaged in impermissible viewpoint discrimination in contravention of
the First Amendment.300 It concluded:
The public funding of art remains within the complete discretion of
the city council. . . . Once a governing body chooses to fund art,
however, the Constitution requires that it be funded in a viewpointneutral manner, that is, without discriminating among recipients on
the basis of their ideology. . . . It should be remembered, however,
that First Amendment principles also protect the right of those

294. Id. at 454 (citations omitted).
295. Id. at 455 (citation omitted).
296. Id. (citation omitted).
297. Id. at 441, 461.
298. Id. at 461.
299. Id. at 463. Additionally, the court found that “the evidence in [the] case [did not]
support a conclusion that the council would have defunded the plaintiffs in the absence of
Esperanza’s expressions of viewpoint,” and that, to the contrary, “the overwhelming evidence
suggest[ed] that absent the constitutionally protected conduct, most city council members would
never have heard of Esperanza.” Id. at 462.
300. Id. at 479.
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citizens who oppose funding for the plaintiffs to freely make their
own views known.301

In both Brooklyn Institute and Esperanza, the government
terminated, or sought to terminate, funding for arts organizations
because of its objections to their exhibits or programming. 302 In both
cases, it was clear that the government’s objections to the organization’s
speech was the root of its decision to terminate funding. 303
Additionally, the government had initially provided the funding and
only terminated (or sought to terminate) the funding once it discovered
that the organization’s speech was objectionable. 304 This is similar to
the facts of the Machete case, discussed infra, where the Texas Film
Commission approved the preliminary grant application for the film but
subsequently withdrew its approval after film’s content caused
controversy. That case is discussed next.
X. MACHETE AND MACHETE KILLS
A. The Texas Film Commission Kills Funding for Machete
As previously discussed, Chop Shop, the production company
responsible for Machete, applied for and received initial grant approval
for the film from the Texas Film Commission. 305
When the
Commission notified Chop Shop of its initial approval, it also notified it
that the initial approval “‘pertain[ed] only to the qualification of the
application’ and that ‘[i]f the final content is determined to be in
violation of the rules and regulations of the incentive program, the
project [would] not be eligible to receive funds’ from the Program.” 306
301. Id.
302. See id. at 461–63; Brooklyn Inst. of Arts., 64 F. Supp. 2d at 191.
303. See Esperanza Peace & Justice Ctr., 316 F. Supp. 2d at 459–63; Brooklyn Inst. of
Arts., 64 F. Supp. 2d at 191.
304. See Esperanza Peace & Justice Ctr., 316 F. Supp. 2d at 459–63; Brooklyn Inst. of
Arts., 64 F. Supp. 2d at 191.
305. Machete Prods., L.L.C. v. Page, 809 F.3d 281, 286 (5th Cir. 2015).
306. Machete’s Chop Shop, Inc. v. Tex. Film Comm’n, 483 S.W.3d 272, 276 (Tex. Ct.
App. 2016).
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The Commission also informed Chop Shop “that ‘approval of an
incentive application does not guarantee payment of incentive
funds.’”307
After Chop Shop released a trailer for the film referencing a
divisive Arizona anti-immigration law, viewers criticized the film for
promoting a race war.308 This controversy led to public pressure on the
Texas Film Commission to withdraw its support for the film. 309
Following the film’s release in September 2010, Chop Shop provided
the Commission with its final documentation, including the film’s final
script, as required by the Incentive Program guidelines. 310 The
Commission subsequently informed Chop Shop that “‘[b]ased on the
final review of content, the feature Machete does not qualify for a grant
from the Texas Moving Image Industry Incentive Program.’” 311 As the
basis for its denial, the Commission cited Texas Government Code
section 485.022(e), “which provides that the Commission ‘may deny an
application because of inappropriate content or content that portrays
Texas or Texans in a negative fashion, as determined by the
[Commission].’”312
Chop Shop challenged the denial in court (“Machete I”). 313 It
contended that once the Commission approved its initial application—in
essence “verif[ying] that ‘the [film’s] content is in compliance with the
rules and regulations governing the application process’”—the
Commission could not then deny Chop Shop an Incentive Program
grant unless “‘substantial changes’” had occurred during production of
the film to include “‘inappropriate content or content that portrays

307. Id.
308. Richard Whittaker, Is that a Wrap for Incentives?, AUSTIN CHRONICLE (Jan. 28,
2011), https://www.austinchronicle.com/screens/2011-01-28/is-that-a-wrap-for-incentives
[https://perma.cc/3D4B-5RQP].
309. Machete Prods., L.L.C, 809 F.3d at 286.
310. Machete’s Chop Shop, Inc., 483 S.W.3d at 276–77.
311. Id. at 277.
312. Id. (specifying that the determination be made by the Music, Film, Television, and
Multimedia Office, which, in turn, assigned the Incentive Program’s administration to the Film
Commission).
313. See id. at 279.
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Texas or Texans in a negative fashion.’”314 This was not the case here,
as the Machete script’s final version did not materially differ from the
original submission.315 Chop Shop argued that without such changes,
the Commission was bound by its initial determination that Chop Shop
qualified for the Incentive Program grant. 316
The court’s analysis focused on the construction of the statute and
regulations that created the Incentive Program and detailed the manner
of its operation. 317 It found that the statute’s requirement that the
Commission conduct a final script review before awarding any grant
cannot be read to create a “standard” for either awarding or denying
a grant application. The statute does not direct the Commission to
take any particular action based on its final content review. It does
not require that a grant be awarded if no substantial changes
occurred during production, nor does it require that the
Commission deny a grant if substantial changes occurred during
production that caused the film to include content that portrays
Texas or Texans in a negative fashion. The decision to award or
deny a grant remains within the Commission’s discretion. Indeed,
the only constraint on the Commission’s authority is the mandate
that “the [Commission] shall consider general standards of decency
and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the citizens of
Texas” when determining whether to act on or deny a grant
application.318

The court also noted that the Texas legislature “undoubtedly
intended to provide the Commission with discretion throughout the
entire grant approval process.” 319 It based this conclusion on the fact
that the statute “specified that the Commission ‘is not required to act on
any grant application and may deny an application because of
inappropriate content or content that portrays Texas or Texans in a
314. Id. (quoting TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 485.022(e)–(f) (West 2017)).
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. See id. at 282–83.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 283.
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negative fashion.’”320 Thus, the Commission’s “denial of Machete’s
grant application, even post-production, was authorized by the statute”
and “not beyond its statutory authority.”321 To the court, the
Commission was therefore free to deny Chop Shop’s application at any
point in the application process, even if it had previously determined
that the application qualified for a grant. 322 Because Machete I did not
raise a First Amendment challenge to the Commission’s application
denial, the court did not address the issue. The decision therefore
provided little guidance regarding First Amendment protection for state
film incentive programs.
Nevertheless, Machete I is distinguishable from Brooklyn Institute
and Esperanza. Unlike the plaintiffs in Brooklyn Institute and
Esperanza, the plaintiff in Machete I did not receive government
funding. 323 In fact, the plaintiff was not even guaranteed any funds; it
was merely notified that its preliminary application was approved. 324
Moreover, unlike the funding denial in Brooklyn Institute and
Esperanza, the grant denial in Machete I was pursuant to a Texas statute
that gave the government discretionary power. 325 That statute, similar
to the standard in Finley, required the Commission to consider certain
factors, including inappropriate content or content portraying Texas or
Texans in a negative way, but did not require that incentives be denied
to films containing such content. 326 Finally, unlike Brooklyn Institute
and Esperanza, Machete I did not note any Texas government officials’
public criticism of the film’s content. Protests by members of the public
would not raise First Amendment issues. 327
320. Id. (citing GOV’T § 485.022(e)) (explaining that “the absence of an applicant’s right
to judicial review of the Commission’s decision on a grant application confirms the Legislature’s
intent to delegate broad discretion to the Commission to determine which projects will receive
Program grant funds”).
321. Id. at 282–83.
322. Id. at 283.
323. Id. at 276.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 278.
326. Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 569 (1998).
327. First Amendment issues are only raised when the government is objecting to or
restricting speech. See Columbia Broad. Sys. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 139
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Machete opened nationwide on September 3, 2010 in 2,670
theaters, earning $11.4 million during its opening weekend (on an
estimated $10.5 million budget).328 It was that weekend’s secondhighest grossing film, just below the George Clooney-starring film, The
American.329 During 2010, Machete grossed over $26.5 million in the
U.S. alone, 330 making it the 100th largest domestic-grossing film that
year.331 The film’s success lead to a Machete sequel, Machete Kills.332
B. Funding for Machete Kills Meets the Same Fate as Machete
Production of Machete Kills began in Texas in 2012.333 Despite
the Commission’s denial of the original film’s application, Machete
Productions sought an Incentive Program grant for the sequel. 334 Before
submitting its application, however, Machete Productions was informed
that “the film would never receive an Incentive Program grant due to
the perceived political nature and content of the film.”335 Undeterred,
Machete Productions filed an application. 336 True to form, the
Commission denied the application due to “inappropriate content.” 337

(1973) (Stewart, J., concurring) (noting that “[t]he First Amendment protects the press from
governmental interference”).
328. Weekend Box Office Results for September 3–5, 2010, BOX OFFICE MOJO, http://www.box
officemojo.com/weekend/chart/?view=&yr=2010&wknd=36&p=.htm
[http://perma.cc/8C5T2FB9].
329. Id.
330. Machete (2010), IMDB http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0985694/ [https://perma.cc/EYT9FSBU].
331. 2010 Yearly Box Office Results, BOX OFFICE MOJO, http://www.boxofficemojo.com/
yearly/chart/?yr=2010&p=.htm [http://perma.cc/SUA9-5KDK].
332. Machete Prods., L.L.C, 809 F.3d at 286.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Id.
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However, the Commission failed to explain what content was
inappropriate. 338
Machete Productions filed suit challenging the denial (“Machete
339
II”).
It alleged that the Commission “applied the Incentive Program
to it in a way that discriminated against it on the basis of viewpoint, thus
violating its First Amendment rights.” 340
Machete Productions
contended that “[t]he real reason for the Commission’s denial [was] that
the Commission was concerned with the political fallout from providing
public money to a film perceived as glorifying the role of a Mexican
Federale (Mexican Federal Police Officer) and sympathizing with
immigrants.”341
Addressing Machete Productions’ viewpoint-discrimination claim,
the court cited Rust for the proposition that the government may
“‘selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities it believes to
be in the public interest, without at the same time funding an alternative
program which seeks to deal with the problem in another way.’” 342
Thus, the court explained, there is no viewpoint discrimination, just the
government’s choice “‘to fund one activity at the exclusion of the
other.’”343 Such a government funding provision, the court continued,
does not violate the First Amendment “as long as it ‘[does] not silence
speakers by expressly threaten[ing] censorship of ideas,’ or ‘introduce
considerations that, in practice, would effectively preclude or punish the
expression of particular views.’”344
Acknowledging that First Amendment protections apply to subsidy
grants, the court observed that the government—here, the Texas Film
338. Id.; Muriel Perkins, ‘Machete Kills’ Producer Sues Texas Officials, COURTHOUSE
NEWS SERV. (Mar. 17, 2014), http://www.courthousenews.com/machete-kills-producer-suestexas-officials/ [http://perma.cc/E7JR-KYTX].
339. Machete Prods., L.L.C., 809 F.3d at 286.
340. Id.
341. Plaintiff’s Original Petition at 2, Machete Prods. L.L.C. v. Page, 809 F.3d 281, 289
(5th Cir. 2015) (No. D-1-GN-14-000744).
342. Machete Prods., L.L.C., 809 F.3d at 289 (quoting Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173,
193 (1991)).
343. Id. (quoting Rust, 500 U.S. at 193).
344. Id. (quoting Finley, 524 U.S. at 583).
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Commission—”‘may allocate competitive funding according to criteria
that would be impermissible were direct regulation of speech or a
criminal penalty [at] stake.’” 345 Nevertheless, the court cautioned,
“[g]overnment funding provisions can become unconstitutional
conditions if they ‘effectively prohibit the recipient from engaging in
the protected conduct outside the scope of the [government] funded
program,’ or if the subsidy is ‘manipulated to have a coercive
effect.’”346
Applying these principles to the case before it, the court concluded
that the grant denial did not “‘effectively preclude or punish’ Machete
[Productions] from or for holding particular viewpoints in Machete
Kills.”347 Likewise, the court held, the denial did not effectively
prohibit Machete Productions from producing the film. 348 After all, it
reasoned, “[d]espite the denial of an Incentive Program grant, Machete
Kills was still filmed in Texas, produced, and released.” 349 The court
therefore rejected Machete Productions’ contention that “the First
Amendment requires a state which has an incentive program like this
one to fund films casting the state in a negative light.” 350 In other
words, the court held that because Machete Productions remained free
to produce its film outside the Incentive Program’s context, the
Commission acted lawfully within its discretion by denying funding for
the film.
Machete Productions also attacked the “vagueness” of the
standards used to award and deny grants. 351 In its explanation for
rejecting the vagueness claim, the court noted that the “Due Process
Clause does protect speakers ‘from arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement of vague standards,’ but ‘when the [g]overnment is acting
as a patron rather than as sovereign, the consequences of imprecision
345. Id. at 290 (quoting Finley, 524 U.S. at 587–88).
346. Id. (first quoting Rust, 500 U.S. at 197; and then quoting Finley, 524 U.S. at 587).
347. Id. (quoting Finley, 524 U.S. at 583).
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. Id. (citing Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011)).
351. Id. at 291.
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are not constitutionally severe.’” 352 In the present case, the court
observed, “the Incentive Program’s funding criteria are not any more
imprecise than the criteria found to pass constitutional muster in
Finley.”353
Accordingly, the court held that the Commission’s denial of
Machete Productions’ grant application did not violate the company’s
First Amendment rights.354 In other words, the Machete II court relied
on Rust and Finley to allow the Commission to deny Machete
Productions’ grant application because of the film’s content, 355
reasoning that Machete Productions was free to, and did, make the film
despite its application’s denial. 356
XI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Can states refuse to provide film incentive program funding for
films whose content the state finds objectionable because, for example,
the content is “inappropriate” or portrays the state or its residents in a
negative way? As the foregoing analysis indicates, the answer is likely
“yes.” This is largely due to the wide latitude courts give the
government to designate subsidies’ purposes 357 (provided they are not
designed to encourage viewpoint diversity), 358 as well as courts’
sanctioning of the use of criteria in granting those subsidies that would
be impermissible in a speech-regulation context.359 So long as the
funding denial does not “effectively prohibit” the filmmaker from
making the film outside the incentive program’s scope, the denial is

352. Id. (quoting Finley, 524 U.S. at 588–89).
353. Id. (observing that “[b]oth provisions require that the relevant agency consider the
‘general standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values’ of citizens.,” and that
“[t]he Incentive Program’s statute . . . adds that the Commission may also deny an application
due to ‘inappropriate content or content that portrays Texas or Texans in a negative fashion’”).
354. Id.
355. Id. at 289.
356. Id. at 290–92.
357. See supra Part VI.
358. See supra Part VI.
359. See supra Part VI.
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likely within the state’s authority and not a violation of the applicant’s
First Amendment rights.360
The decisions in Rosenberger and Finley indicate that film
incentive programs likely do not constitute a public forum, as the
programs are not intended “to encourage a diversity of views from
private speakers.”361 Instead, film incentive programs’ typical purpose
is to encourage economic activity within a state. 362 The economic
benefit derives not only from the film production, but also from the
increased tourism likely to result from a production painting the state
favorably. 363 A film’s content is therefore relevant to a state’s decision
to support productions that best achieve these results. And because film
incentive programs likely do not constitute public forums,364 viewpointdiscrimination prohibitions do not apply here. 365 This does not mean
that courts will uphold any type of government discrimination. If the
incentive awards are designed to have a coercive effect or are aimed at
the suppression of unpopular ideas, then courts will likely find those
government actions unconstitutional. 366 However, laws and regulations
allowing states to consider a film’s content, rather than prohibiting
certain types of content, will likely be found constitutional. 367
The Texas statute, for example, provides that the Texas Film
Commission “may deny an application because of [a film’s]
inappropriate content or content that portrays Texas or Texans in a
negative fashion, as determined by the [Commission].” 368 It further
provides that, “[i]n determining whether to act on or deny a grant
360. See supra Part VII.
361. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 834 (1995).
362. See supra Part III.
363. See supra Part III.
364. See supra Part VI.
365. See supra Part VI.
366. See supra Part VIII.
367. However, if those laws or regulations are applied in a coercive or suppressive
manner, an affected filmmaker may be able to mount a successful First Amendment challenge in
court. See supra Part VIII.
368. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 485.022(e) (West 2017).
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application, the [Commission] shall consider general standards of
decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the citizens of
Texas.”369 The first part of this provision—dealing with inappropriate
content or negative portrayals of Texas or Texans 370—seems consistent
with the program’s purpose to attract economic activity and tourism to
the state. Thus, as the Machete II court held, it is permissible under
Rust.371
The second part—dealing with “decency and respect for the
diverse beliefs and values of the citizens of Texas”372—is, with the
exception of its focus on Texas residents, the same language that was
upheld in Finley.373 Furthermore, as in Finley, these provisions are not
written as prohibitions. Instead, the Commission “may” deny an
application because of inappropriate content or negative portrayals of
Texas or Texans.374 The Commission is not required to deny
applications for productions that contain these types of content. 375 In
fact, the Commission may provide funding to such productions.376 The
same is true of the second half of the provision, which simply requires
the Commission to consider the values of decency and respect.377 The
Commission may still fund productions it finds indecent or
disrespectful. 378 As the court observed in Machete I, Texas law gives
the Commission great discretion to approve or deny applications and
even permits the Commission to take no action at all. 379
369. Id.
370. Id.
371. See supra Part X.
372. GOV’T § 485.022(e).
373. See supra Part VI.
374. GOV’T § 485.022(e).
375. See id.
376. See id.
377. See id.
378. See id.
379. Machete’s Chop Shop, Inc. v. Tex. Film Comm’n, 483 S.W.3d 272, 281, 283–84
(Tex. Ct. App. 2016) (citing GOV’T § 485.022(e)).

TIMMER

2018]

3/22/2018 8:01 PM

THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND CONTENT RESTRICTIONS

93

Indeed, the Texas film incentive program provisions were
challenged and upheld in Machete I and Machete II (collectively,
“Machete Cases”), even though the government funding-denials
appeared to be, at least in part, a result of the states’ objection to the
films’ content. 380 These cases had key differences from Brooklyn
Institute and Esperanza, where First Amendment violations were
found. 381 In both Brooklyn Institute and Esperanza, the government
was already providing funding to the arts organizations and
subsequently terminated (or sought to terminate) that funding when it
learned the organizations were displaying “offensive” art.382 In the
Machete Cases, however, the Texas Film Commission had yet to
distribute any funds when it made its determination. 383
As a result, the Machete Cases determined that the Texas Film
Commission has great discretionary authority to approve or deny
applications. 384
And relying heavily on Rust, Machete II also
determined that the government did not violate the filmmaker’s First
Amendment rights, provided the incentives-denial did not effectively
prevent the filmmaker from making the film, which it did not. 385 These
cases suggest that, in denying a film funding based on its content, the
government may have more leeway before it issues the funding than
after it has already done so.
Another significant difference between these cases is the
governments’ reasons for refusals or withdrawals of funding. In both
Brooklyn Institute and Esperanza, government officials made numerous
public statements expressing their objection to the speech the recipients
380. See generally Machete Prods., L.L.C. v. Page, 809 F.3d 281 (5th Cir. 2015);
Machete’s Chop Shop, Inc., 483 S.W.3d at 272.
381. See generally Esperanza Peace & Justice Ctr. v. City of San Antonio, 316 F. Supp.
2d 433 (W.D. Tex. 2001); Brooklyn Inst. of Arts & Scis. v. City of New York, 64 F. Supp. 2d
184 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
382. See Esperanza Peace & Justice Ctr., 316 F. Supp. 2d at 459–63; Brooklyn Inst. of
Arts., 64 F. Supp. 2d at 191.
383. See generally Machete Prods., L.L.C., 809 F.3d at 281; Machete’s Chop Shop, Inc.,
483 S.W.3d at 272.
384. See generally Machete Prods., L.L.C., 809 F.3d at 281; Machete’s Chop Shop, Inc.,
483 S.W.3d at 272.
385. See generally Machete Prods., L.L.C., 809 F.3d at 281.
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provided, allowing courts to easily connect those objections with the
decisions to deny funding. 386 These kinds of statements by government
officials were lacking in the Machete Cases: While there was a
significant public outcry against the first Machete film, government
officials were much more restrained about expressing any objections
they might have had to the film’s content than were the officials in
Brooklyn Institute and Esperanza. The Texas Film Commission
provided the Machete films’ producers little reason for their
applications’ rejection, other than the cursory explanation that the films
contained inappropriate content and/or depicted the state or its residents
in a negative light. 387 This language is found in the statute itself, and for
reasons discussed above, does not violate the First Amendment on its
face.
Some commentators have suggested that the Court’s holding in
Finley—the case most relevant here because of its standards’ similarity
to the Texas film incentive program’s provisions—presents disturbing
implications. Karen M. Kowalski observed:
The majority opinion [in Finley] . . . took the stance that the
decency [and respect] clause was constitutional because it was
advisory and not a direct restriction on the content or viewpoint of
the artistic expression. There are arguably two effects on First
Amendment doctrine because of the new “advisory language”
category for government regulation of expression. First, the
Court’s conclusion that the clause is constitutional because it is
“advisory” encourages the deceptive drafting of future legislation.
The Court sends the message to future legislators that the
constitutionality of any legislation will depend not on what type of
expression they seek to prohibit, but rather whether they include
enough prepositions. If by including certain jargon, the legislation
can be read to consider factors rather than require the presence of
certain factors, the legislation will be constitutional. . . . [W]hether
legislation is phrased to consider or require the consideration of
certain values is inconsequential because the decision maker will

386. See generally Esperanza Peace & Justice Ctr., 316 F. Supp. 2d at 433; Brooklyn
Inst. of Arts, 64 F. Supp. 2d at 184.
387. See supra Part X.
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regard the factors as a mandate from Congress rather than merely a
helpful hint.388

Harold B. Walther also found the holding in Finley “problematic
because by holding that only those acts of Congress that expressly
threaten the censorship of ideas will be deemed unconstitutional, the
Court implicitly afforded Congress the power to discriminate against an
individual group or an individual viewpoint.” 389 As Walther sees it,
Finley gives “Congress a ‘violate the First Amendment free’ card,
provided that Congress is inventive enough to reach their desired ends
implicitly, rather than expressly.” 390
It is true, the Finley opinion provides legislatures with guidance on
how to avoid funding disfavored content without violating the First
Amendment. For example, Congress may indirectly prohibit funding to
disfavored content by requiring the decisionmaker to consider such
content rather than directly prohibiting the funding of that content. The
Texas Legislature used this approach when it created the Texas Film
Incentive Program, as its content provisions are only considerations for
the Commission, not actual prohibitions, 391 and the language used in the
statute closely follows that of the provision upheld in Finley.392
The Machete Cases may also guide government officials on how to
avoid funding objectionable artistic speech without violating the First
Amendment. A significant problem for the government in both
Brooklyn Institute and Esperanza was that government officials made
their motivations clear.393 As Sarah F. Warren observed:

388. Karen M. Kowalski, National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley: Painting a Grim
Picture for Federally-Funded Art, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 217, 268 (1999) (citations omitted).
389. Harold B. Walther, Note, National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley: Sinking
Deeper into the Abyss of the Supreme Court’s Unintelligible Modern Unconstitutional Conditions
Doctrine, 59 MD. L. REV. 225, 250 (2000).
390. Id.
391. GOV’T §485.002(e).
392. See supra Part VI.
393. Esperanza Peace & Justice Ctr., 316 F. Supp. 2d at 459–61; Brooklyn Inst. of Arts,
64 F. Supp. 2d at 186.
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The difficulty with Esperanza [arose] only because the City
Council was not savvy enough to deny funding to the Esperanza
Center without admitting that they were doing so based on the
particular views expressed. In fact, the City did little to conceal its
motives behind the budget cut. Indeed, they were quite honest
about their dislike for the Esperanza Center’s views. 394

On the other hand, in the Machete Cases, it appears the
government did little more than cite the statute as the reason for its
funding denial. 395 It did not add their voices to the public campaign
against the first Machete film, considered objectionable by members of
the public. 396 And while it is possible that this restraint helped the
Texas Film Commission’s case, it certainly did not hurt it.
These lessons, while potentially instructive for legislators and
other government officials, likely give little comfort to filmmakers. As
discussed above, courts allow the government wide latitude to deny
subsidies, even permitting it to use criteria in the subsidy context that
would clearly be forbidden in a regulatory context.397 Moreover,
proving prohibited discrimination in these contexts is near impossible,
as the Supreme Court has recognized:
When the limited spending program does not create a public
forum, proving coercion is virtually impossible, because simply denying
a subsidy “does not ‘coerce’ belief,” and because the criterion of
unconstitutionality is whether denial of the subsidy threatens “to drive
certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace.” Absent such a
threat, “the Government may allocate . . . funding according to criteria
that would be impermissible were direct regulation of speech or a
criminal penalty at stake.”398
Finley seems to grant legislators even more latitude to craft
subsidy programs to include otherwise impermissible criteria, provided
394. See Sarah F. Warren, Note, Art: To Fund or Not to Fund? That Is Still the
Question, 19 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 149, 171 (2001) (citations omitted).
395. See supra Part X.
396. See supra Part X.
397. See supra Part VI.
398. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 552-53 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(alteration in original) (citations omitted).
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those criteria are mere considerations rather than outright
prohibitions. 399 Furthermore, the denial of a subsidy only eliminates a
potential source of funding for filmmakers, leaving filmmakers in no
worse a position than before applying for the subsidy. The key factor
for the government, in avoiding the application of the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine, is that filmmakers remain free to produce their
films with objectionable content outside the incentive program. Using
Texas as an example—although this observation applies to other states’
incentive programs as well—while filmmakers are free to make films
that portray Texas negatively, they are not entitled to have Texas pay
for those films.

399. See supra Part VI.

